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The Aggregate Impacts of Tournament Incentives 
in Experimental Asset Markets* 
Debapriya Jojo Paul† Julia Henker‡  Sian Owen§ 
March 22, 2015 
Abstract 
Existing studies of the aggregate impacts of tournament incentives find that asset price 
bubbles in experimental markets are larger and do not dissipate with experience when 
participants trade under tournament incentives. However, these results potentially overstate 
the real-world impacts of tournament incentives for two reasons. First, they examine 
tournaments in a restrictive single-asset market setting, which constrains the risk-taking 
options available to traders. Second, by purely conferring additional rewards for good relative 
performance, the tournament contracts used ignore the risk-moderating role played by 
penalties that are also written into or implicit in real-world counterparts. We address these 
gaps by examining how prices behave under tournament incentives in experimental markets 
where participants can trade two assets with differing risk-levels. In addition, we compare 
price behaviour under tournament incentives with and without an embedded penalty for poor 
performance. Our findings suggest that the results in the existing literature are driven by the 
single-asset nature of their markets – we do not find any compelling evidence that prices in 
two-asset markets are more distorted under tournament incentives than normal incentives. 
Moreover bubbles in these markets do diminish with experience under tournament incentives. 
Also, while penalties embedded into tournament contracts are associated with less trading 
activity in markets compared to reward-only tournament contracts, they are also associated 
with longer periods of overvaluation and higher prices, albeit only with inexperienced traders. 
These results are particularly significant in light of the recent debate attributing financial 
market instability to convex incentive structures such as tournament incentives.
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1. Introduction 
Professionals in the intensely competitive world of finance routinely vie for ‘prizes’ 
such as bonuses, fund flows, and promotions that are tied to their performance relative to 
others. This gives many of the incentive schemes used in the industry the flavour of a 
tournament, which is characterised by compensation that depends on an employee’s relative 
rather than absolute performance. The sizeable upside provided by these compensation 
structures, often not matched by an offsetting downside, creates ‘convex’ incentives. In light 
of the severe dysfunction that has punctuated financial markets this century – most notably 
during the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the US sub-prime mortgage crisis – concerns 
have been raised that such incentives may help precipitate market instability by encouraging 
excessive risk-taking and short-termism (Rajan 2006; Bebchuk and Spamann 2010; Wagner 
2013)
1
. Yet despite the obvious importance of these concerns, the market-level effects of 
tournament incentives remain relatively unexplored and are not well understood.  
On the one hand, that tournaments alter the risk-taking incentives of individuals is a 
well established point in the literature – since the most lucrative prizes go to winners, 
tournament incentives may encourage some contestants, particularly those who trail the 
leader, to take more risk in an attempt to ‘win’ (Bronars 1987; Hvide 2002; Cabral 2003; 
Tsetlin, Gaba and Winkler 2004). However, the implications of such behaviour for market 
prices have only been examined in a handful of studies, mostly in confines of the 
experimental laboratory where traders’ incentives and asset fundamentals can be readily 
manipulated. The experimental studies, all conducted using the continuous double-auction 
bubble-market design of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), support the view of 
tournaments as a distortionary force in markets. They generally find that tournament 
                                                     
1
 See also Rajan (2008) and Blinder (2009) for treatments of this issue in the news media.  
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incentives exacerbate asset price bubbles – periods of sustained overvaluation – compared to 
absolute-performance based incentives, an effect that is, alarmingly, only magnified as 
participants gain more experience (James and Isaac 2000; Cheung and Coleman 2014). 
In this paper, we extend the nascent experimental literature on the aggregate impacts 
of tournament incentives by addressing two issues affecting existing studies that potentially 
reduce the generalisability and real-world relevance of their results. First, we examine how 
market prices behave under tournament incentives when subjects can trade more than one 
type of risky asset. In contrast, existing studies only examine single-asset trading 
environments, which unduly restrict the risk-taking options available to traders compared to 
real-world markets. Investors seeking to ‘get ahead’ in the real world not only have the ability 
to speculate on a specific security, but also alter the risk profile of their portfolios by shifting 
into alternative, inherently riskier asset classes or securities. Thus it stands to reason that 
price behaviour in single-asset markets may differ from multi-asset markets.  
Second, we investigate what impact adding a penalty for underperformance to a 
tournament contract has on market prices. Despite theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting that penalties, or ‘sticks’ in tournament contracts can curtail risk-taking by 
contestants (Gilpatric 2009; Qiu 2003; Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele 2009; Hu, Kale, Pagani, 
and Subramanian 2011), the experimental literature pays scant attention to the role played by 
disincentives, focusing instead on the ‘carrots’, or rewards paid for good relative 
performance. Thus, rather than strictly being a tournament phenomenon, it may be that the 
heightened overvaluation seen in existing studies are driven by the absence of consequences 
attached to poor performance arising from excessive speculation. However, given that the 
fear of underperformance potentially encourages traders to herd (Rajan 2006; Dass, Massa 
and Patgiri 2008), the addition of a penalty may actually result in even higher prices, and 
hence is an open empirical issue.     
 4 
To examine these issues, we implemented a between-subjects experimental design 
featuring three treatments that differ only in the way in which participants were remunerated 
– a normal incentive Baseline treatment, and two tournament treatments Carrot and Stick, 
where the latter is identical to Carrot but includes a penalty for underperformance in the form 
of a significantly reduced payment (zero!). While the compensation contracts in the Carrot 
and Stick treatments rewarded/penalised traders on the basis of their performance relative to 
the ‘average’ trader (as in James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003)), we also 
implemented a set of alternative tournament contracts based on a rank-order tournament (i.e. 
where rank determines payoff), called GilCarrot and GilStick. Participants in all treatments 
traded in a Smith et al (1988)-type experimental asset market featuring two risky assets – a 
low-risk asset called X, which paid a modestly sized divided in each period, and a high-risk 
asset called Y, which paid a lottery-like dividend, thus allowing participants to more naturally 
vary risk than earlier studies have allowed.  
Our first result suggests that the main conclusions in the existing literature are driven 
by the single-asset nature of their markets. We do not find any compelling evidence that 
tournament incentives – whether measured using the Carrot, Stick, GilCarrot, or GilStick 
treatments – distort prices more than absolute-performance based incentives (Baseline), as 
gauged by the size and duration of mispricing/bubbles in the markets of the respective 
treatments. Moreover, we find that bubbles under tournament incentives do moderate in size 
and duration as traders gain experience of the experimental design. In fact, evidence of 
improvement in price behaviour with once-experienced traders is weaker in the normal-
incentive Baseline treatment than it is in our two tournament treatments.    
On the impact of penalties, our second result finds that, in markets populated with 
inexperienced traders, embedding a penalty into a tournament contract that rewards traders 
for above-average performance (i.e. Stick) reduces the amount of trading activity compared to 
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the corresponding reward-only contract (Carrot). However, consistent with the herding 
hypothesis, the trading activity that occurs in Stick markets is actually characterised by 
significantly longer booms (periods of overvaluation) in both risky assets, in addition to 
significantly higher prices in the high-risk asset. These differences however disappear with 
experienced participants. Moreover, we do not detect a significant difference in price 
behaviour between the rank-order tournament treatments, GilCarrot and GilStick, with 
inexperienced or experienced traders. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the 
related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 details the experimental design, while 
section 4 describes our results. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 5.      
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Tournaments at the individual-level 
The effect of tournament incentives on the behaviour of individuals is the subject of 
an extensive academic literature, the theoretical underpinnings of which have its formal 
beginnings in optimal labour market contracting under moral hazard. Starting with Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) and developed further by Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983), O’Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1986) and others, much of the 
early literature, along with the associated empirical work (e.g. Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 
1987, Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990) examines the comparative efficiency and optimality of 
the incentives provided by tournaments vis-à-vis other incentive structures such as piece 
rates. Importantly, the variable of interest and the only lever available to agents to affect their 
chances of winning in these early models is the amount of effort they choose to expend. Of 
 6 
course, players in a tournament can often also vary the amount of risk they take, and thus a 
sub-strand of the literature has emerged that focuses on risk-taking incentives in tournaments.  
Bronars (1987, cited in Hvide 2002, p. 880) was the first to introduce risk-taking as a 
choice variable into a tournament model, finding that in sequential tournaments, it is optimal 
for leaders to reduce risk, while followers are inclined to increase risk in order to catch-up. 
The basic intuition underlying this result arises from the convexity of payoffs produced by 
tournaments. Faced with a win/lose dichotomy, the consequences of losing by a lot are the 
same as losing by a small margin
2. Hence, laggards are better off ‘going for broke’ in the 
hope of maximising their chances of securing the larger prize earned by the winner(s), 
whereas leaders should try and ‘lock in’ their gains by playing conservatively. Results in line 
with this are also reported in a multi-period setting by Tsetlin et al (2004) and in an infinite-
period model by Cabral (2003). 
Other models however reveal a more nuanced relationship. Gaba and Kalra (1999) 
and Gaba, Tsetlin and Winkler (2004) show in a one-period setting that risk-taking incentives 
are sensitive to the proportion of players deemed ‘winners’/‘losers’. When the proportion of 
winners is low (specifically, less than 0.5), players have an incentive to ‘break away from the 
herd’ by increasing risk (as measured by variance). Conversely, when the proportion of 
winners is high (greater than 0.5), the priority is to avoid an especially poor performance, 
thus making a low-variance strategy optimal. Nieken and Sliwka (2010) demonstrate using a 
two-player model that the correlation between the outcomes of contestants’ risky strategies is 
another important determinant of risk-taking preferences. When risky outcomes are 
uncorrelated between players – as is typical of most tournament models in the literature – the 
leader (laggard) prefers to play it safe (take risks), provided the additional expected return 
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 This describes most tournament models in the literature, where 2 (or more) players compete over two levels of 
prizes differentiating winner(s) from loser(s), W1 and W2, where W1 > W2.  
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from the risky strategy is sufficiently small relative to size of the lead. However, as the 
correlation increases, it becomes more attractive for the leader to mimic the (anticipated) 
risky strategy of the trailing agent as a means of maintaining their lead. Of course, the trailing 
agent is aware of this, hence at high correlations (>0.5), a mixed strategy equilibrium may 
exist in which the leading player chooses the risky strategy with a higher probability than the 
trailing player. 
While the aforementioned studies of risk-taking in tournaments ignore effort as a 
choice-variable and consider only the risk-level, Hvide (2002) combines the two by 
examining a one-period symmetric tournament where players simultaneously choose both the 
mean (effort) and variance (risk) of their output. In equilibrium, all participants adopt the 
highest possible level of risk and expend low effort; since expending effort is costly, players 
have a common incentive to take high risk because it induces noise in the level of output, 
which makes differences in effort less important to their chances of winning/losing
3
. 
However, Kräkel and Sliwka (2004) show that the uniform preference for high risk and low 
effort does not necessarily hold when contests are asymmetric. They model a two-player 
tournament where risk-neutral players differ in ability (or equivalently, their relative starting 
positions), and choose risk first and effort second. They find that diverse equilibria are 
possible, with the exact equilibrium depending on the interplay of a number of factors 
including the magnitude of the difference in abilities, the associated interaction between the 
effect of risk-taking on effort and on the probability of winning, the shape of the cost-of-
effort function, and the prize spread. Although no equilibrium in their model sees the high-
ability/leading agent adopt a high-risk strategy whilst the low-ability/trailing agent takes a 
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 In the extreme case where risk is unbounded, players make zero effort and take an infinite amount of risk, 
causing the tournament compensation scheme to fail. In the case of bounded variance, the prize spread (the 
difference between the winning and losing prizes) can be adjusted to maintain first-best levels of effort (i.e. an 
efficient tournament contract) when players are risk-neutral. However in their model, tournaments will be less 
efficient than piece rates when agents are risk-averse. 
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low-risk strategy, the reverse does not always hold (i.e. low-risk for high-ability/leaders and 
high-risk for low-ability/laggards, as in Bronars (1987)).  
Furthermore, in a result that holds particular significance to our study, Gilpatric 
(2009) shows that asymmetry in the prize structure of a tournament can also affect the 
incentive to take risk. Specifically, Gilpatric demonstrates that adding a third payoff level – 
an explicit penalty for finishing last (a ‘stick’) – to the customary prizes for the winner (a 
‘carrot’) and the also-rans in a winner-takes-all contest can curb risk-taking by risk-neutral 
contestants. In the presence of a penalty for severe underperformance, those who trail the 
leader no longer increase risk (i.e. variance) with impunity, since increasing risk also entails a 
greater possibility of finishing with an even lower payoff. In the model, the precise amount of 
risk-taking in equilibrium can be controlled by adjusting the relative sizes of the carrot (the 
additional reward to the winner) and the stick (the penalty for coming last) – the larger the 
carrot relative to the stick, the greater the incentive to engage in risk-seeking behaviour. 
In addition to the theoretical literature, a growing body of research has examined risk-
taking in tournaments empirically. In finance, the relevance of tournament theory to the funds 
management industry has attracted much interest
4
. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) argue 
that mutual fund managers engage in annual contests with each other because their 
compensation is typically tied to the value of funds under their management, which in turn 
depends on their recent performance relative to other funds – the best-performing funds 
receive the largest inflows of new funds, while those performing poorly do not experience 
similar-scaled outflows (Sirri and Tufano 1998). This convexity in the relationship between 
relative performance and compensation motivates Brown et al to hypothesise that fund 
                                                     
4
 The dominance of relative-performance concerns and the presence of highly incentivised contestants mean 
that the world of professional sport has also attracted significant empirical interest. A number of studies look at 
risk-taking by contestants in motorsports (Becker and Huselid 1992; Bothner, Kang and Stuart 2007), golf 
(Brown and Li 2010), basketball (Grund, Höcker, and Zimmerman 2013), weightlifting (Genakos and Pagliero 
2012), and high-stakes poker (Lee 2004). 
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managers who are ‘losing’ mid-way through the year will increase the risk of their portfolios 
more than mid-year ‘winners’. Although they find evidence supporting their hypothesis in 
their sample, subsequent research has provided mixed, often contradictory results
5
. These 
conflicts can (at least partially) be reconciled by the aforementioned contributions to 
tournament theory that show that it is not always optimal for laggards (leaders) to be more 
risk-seeking (conservative)
6
. Moreover, significantly for our study, a number of empirical 
studies lend support to the theory posited by Gilpatric (2009) that penalties/disincentives 
serve to moderate risk-taking – Qiu (2003), Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009), and Hu, Kale, 
Pagani, and Subramanian (2011) all observe that greater termination risk (the risk of job-loss) 
has a negative effect on risk-taking by fund managers. 
2.2 Tournaments at the market-level 
In contrast to the substantive literature on tournament behaviour at the individual-
level, the market-level impacts of tournaments have received relatively little attention. To the 
best of our knowledge, a series of experiments by James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and 
James (2003) represent the first and until recently, only attempt by researchers to study the 
aggregate effects of tournament incentives. Noting that tournaments can alter individuals’ 
risk-taking incentives, the question these studies pose is whether tournament incentives 
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 See for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Koski and Pontiff (1999), Busse (2001), Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (2003), Qiu (2003), Goriaev, Nijman and Weker (2005), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Chen and Pennacchi 
(2009), Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009), Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny and Ozelge (2010), and Hu, Kale, 
Pagani, and Subramanian (2011). 
6
 Brown et al (1996) have also inspired a number of theoretical tournament models of the mutual fund industry. 
Taylor (2003) tackles the issue of risk-taking by leaders/laggards in a two-player mutual fund tournament. In a 
strategic setting where the risky strategy yields the same return for both players, the (mixed-strategy) 
equilibrium is characterised by the mid-year winner being more likely adopt a high-risk strategy than the loser. 
Taylor’s model is a special case of the model developed by Nieken and Sliwka (2010), where the correlation 
between contestants’ risky strategies is set at 1. Bagnoli and Watts (2000) consider the risk choices of fund 
managers in the presence of return-chasing investors (i.e. in a tournament). They show that risk-neutral fund 
managers will invest in riskier portfolios compared to the case where investors don’t chase returns, and this 
behaviour will be amplified if investors select funds based on rankings rather than performance relative to the 
average. Acker and Duck (2006) examine the propensity of fund managers to take ‘extreme’ positions (mostly 
cash or mostly shares) in a 2-period model where one of the managers is an exogenous passive ‘benchmark’. 
They find that trailing funds are more likely to take extreme positions, especially if they are far behind, or as the 
end of the tournament approaches. 
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distort market prices by fuelling speculative asset price bubbles. Using a within-subject 
design and the oft-replicated Smith et al (1988) double-auction market as a baseline, they 
examine how prices are affected by the introduction of a tournament condition that rewards 
traders on the basis of their performance relative to the ‘average’ trader. Typically, when 
traders are compensated according to their absolute performance, prices converge quickly to 
fundamental value in markets consisting of (twice) experienced traders. However, this 
convergence fails to occur once James and Isaac introduce tournament contracts. In fact, 
repeated exposure to tournament incentives causes prices to deviate further from fundamental 
value. James and Isaac explain this by showing that it may be mutually advantageous (i.e. 
rational) for risk-neutral traders to transact at prices above (or below) fundamental value 
under their tournament contract.  
A recent study by Cheung and Coleman (2014) reinforces the main results of James 
and Isaac (2000). They investigate prices under tournament incentives in both declining (i.e. 
Smith et al 1988) and constant fundamental value markets but use a different tournament 
compensation contract, based on the mutual fund industry’s convex performance-fund flow 
relationship; they also use a between-subjects design, which is free of the order effects that 
can afflict within-subject designs
7
. Somewhat contrastingly, Robin, Straznicka, and Villeval 
(2012) find that long-term and short-term competitive bonuses have differing effects. Their 
long-term contract pays a bonus at the end of the market based on relative performance over 
the course of the entire market, whereas the short-term contract awards a bonus at the end of 
each trading period. They find that their long-term bonus contract produces less price 
distortion than both short-term bonus and normal incentive contracts, although it is unclear if 
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 Specifically, Cheung and Coleman (2014) detect significantly larger bubble Amplitudes and Durations under 
tournament incentives in inexperienced Smith et al (1988) markets. Differences become larger in experienced 
Smith et al markets, across a wider range of bubble measures. The effect of tournaments in their constant 
fundamental value markets is milder than in declining fundamental value markets, but nonetheless is still 
sizeable.  
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their results are driven by the incentives or the changing liquidity of the market that is 
induced by the payment of bonuses in their short-term contract (Palan 2013)
8
. 
A common element of the design of these experimental studies is their use of markets 
featuring only one type of risky asset. This poses a potential problem for the generalisability 
of their results because unlike real markets, where investors have the opportunity to alter 
portfolio risk by shifting between a variety of asset classes and securities that are intrinsically 
more/less risky or speculative in nature, the risk-taking options for traders looking to ‘win’ in 
a single-asset environment are extremely limited – they are restricted to simply acquiring 
more of the same asset by paying higher prices in the hope of selling at a profit or getting 
lucky with high dividend payments (or both). Therefore, it is uncertain how applicable the 
behaviour elicited by single-asset markets is to multi-asset environments, or indeed the real 
world. Thus, by better approximating real-world markets, an experimental market containing 
more than one type of risky asset should allow for more natural risk-shifting behaviour, and 
thus better scope to understand the aggregate impacts of tournament incentives. Our study 
fills this gap in the literature by examining if tournament contracts distort prices more/less 
than absolute-performance-based incentives in experimental asset markets where participants 
can simultaneously trade two differentiated risky assets. Thus our first hypothesis, stated in 
the null, is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Price behaviour does not differ between tournament markets and normal-
incentive markets. 
                                                     
8
 Ang, Diavatopoulos and Schwarz (2010) also implement tournament incentives in an experimental market, but 
only in every alternate trading period as an additional compensation scheme, with the aim of creating a 
shortened investment horizon for traders. This significant departure in methodology makes it is difficult to place 
their results amongst the other experimental literature. Ang et al find that the effect of shortened 
horizons/tournament incentives on bubbles depend on the risk-attitudes of the traders in their markets and 
whether participants trade with their own money.  
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We also examine if the reported tendency for bubbles to worsen with trading 
experience under tournament conditions is sustained in a two-asset environment, leading to 
our second (null) hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Price behaviour under tournament incentives does not differ between markets 
containing traders who are inexperienced with regards to the experimental 
design versus once-experienced traders.   
 
Another attribute that the existing experimental studies have in common lies in the 
design of their tournament compensation contracts – being solely characterised by the 
payment of additional rewards for good relative performance, their contracts are all ‘carrot’, 
no ‘stick’. For instance, James and Isaac (2000) pay a flat fee to traders who perform below 
average, while above-average performers are rewarded with an additional bonus that is 
proportional to the degree to which they outperform the average. Similarly, Cheung and 
Coleman (2014) and Robin et al. (2012) periodically award new funds to traders based on 
their relative performance in the previous sub-period of the market. In doing so, these studies 
overlook the importance of disincentives or ‘sticks’ in employment contracts, specifically 
penalties attached to poor performance, which may serve to moderate risk-taking (Gilpatric 
2009). Hence, it may not be tournament incentives driving their results per se, rather the 
balance, or lack thereof, between ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in their contracts.   
However, while introducing a penalty into a tournament contract may deter 
individuals from taking risks, the implications for market prices are less clear. On the one 
hand, penalising underperformance may produce lower prices by discouraging traders from 
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bidding excessively for assets, since doing so makes them more likely to underperform. 
However, this fear of underperformance may perversely result in higher prices. Rajan (2006) 
argues that relative-performance based compensation encourages investment managers to 
herd, since herding reduces the chances of underperforming. While this in itself may create a 
bubble, it also means fund managers may choose to ‘ride the bubble’ because the alternatives 
of trading against it or doing nothing expose them to the risk of underperforming if the 
mispricing persists. As a result, bubbles may ‘inflate’ further and last longer. In this context, 
herding becomes the safe strategy while the risky strategy is to deviate (Dass et al 2008). Of 
course, all of this crucially relies on there being real consequences for underperforming. 
Since including a financial penalty in a tournament contract makes the consequences more 
salient compared to a penalty-free contract, the tendency to herd and thus the severity of asset 
price bubbles may be greater in the presence of a penalty. Furthermore, Dass et al argue that 
bonuses for outperforming the competition (‘carrots’) may actually help to deflate bubbles by 
inducing fund managers to try and win the tournament, something that can only be achieved 
by leaving the safety of the herd. In support of this, they find that during the dot-com bubble, 
the more highly incentivised fund managers had smaller holdings of so-called ‘bubble 
stocks’. 
Our study extends the experimental literature on tournaments by seeking to resolve 
the uncertainty surrounding the aggregate-level impacts of penalties. While Isaac and James 
(2003) also consider a tournament contract with an explicit penalty for severe 
underperformance, they only run two sessions and unsurprisingly obtain inconclusive results. 
In contrast, we comprehensively investigate whether including penalties for 
underperformance affects the severity of mispricing/bubbles compared to tournament 
contracts that contain no such penalties. Hence our third hypothesis, stated in the null, is: 
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Hypothesis 3: Prices do not behave differently between ‘carrots’-only tournament markets 
and ‘carrots-and-sticks’ tournament markets. 
  
In examining the above hypotheses, our study also contributes to the literature on 
bubbles in multi-asset experimental markets, first studied by Fisher and Kelly (2000). Like 
our study, participants in these experiments typically trade two different assets in a market 
that mimics the basic Smith et al (1988) continuous double-auction design. Research 
following Fisher and Kelly (2000) has examined how prices in these markets behave when 
assets becomes differentiated by characteristics such the mean and/or the variance of payoffs, 
or maturity (see Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves 2006; Childs and Mestelman 2006; 
Chan, Lei, and Vesely 2013). We build on this literature by introducing tournament 
incentives into a two-asset market, whereas all research has hitherto been based on ‘normal’, 
or absolute-performance based incentives. In addition, we examine the effect of trading 
experience on bubbles in multi-asset markets, which to our knowledge has not been 
investigated before. 
Our paper perhaps has most in common with Kleinlercher, Huber and Kirchler 
(2014), who also examine the effect of different incentive schemes on price behaviour in a 
two-asset experimental market. Like ours, their incentive schemes include an option-like, 
reward-only “Bonus” contract and a “Penalty” contract. However, the key difference between 
their study and ours is that whereas we examine tournament incentives, they do not. Rather, 
their “Bonus” and “Penalty” treatments are absolute-performance based compensation 
schemes featuring an exogenous benchmark, specifically a pre-defined final cash balance. In 
contrast, the benchmarks in tournament schemes like ours are probabilistic, such as the 
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performance of the “average” trader9. Since optimal risk-taking behaviour may differ for 
individuals faced with an exogenous benchmark versus a contest scenario (Taylor 2003; 
Tsetlin et al 2004), the aggregate implications may also vary. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment comprises 35 independent markets carried out across 19 sessions at 
the ASB Experimental Research Laboratory at UNSW Australia between August and 
November 2013, with 261 subjects taking part across all treatments. Participants were 
university students with no prior experience in market experiments, recruited using ORSEE 
(Greiner 2004)
10
. We begin by describing the parameters of the market institution that were 
common to all sessions before detailing the specific treatment variables. We finish with an 
overview of the procedures followed in each session. 
3.1 Market structure 
In each session, participants were given the opportunity to trade two types of assets 
concurrently, one called “X”, the other called “Y”. The market for both assets ran for 12 
periods, each lasting 3 minutes
11
. Trade occurred according to continuous double-auction 
                                                     
9
 To further highlight the difference, Kleinlercher et al (2014) point out that it is possible under their bonus 
compensation contract for all traders to receive a bonus, since with a favourable dividend outcome, all traders 
could exceed the benchmark-level of cash. In the absence of collusion, this is not possible in tournament 
schemes where bonuses are paid for above-average performance, since almost certainly someone will perform 
below average. 
10
 In total, 38 markets were run. However, some participants with multiple ORSEE profiles managed to ‘slip 
through’ and participated in more than one session of this experiment. To mitigate the potential confounding of 
treatment effects, we have excluded from our analysis any data from the 3 markets that contained a subject who 
had participated in an earlier session. 
11
 While experimental studies of tournament incentives have largely stuck with the parameters in Smith et al 
(1988), there is considerable heterogeneity in studies involving multiple assets. The number of trading periods in 
these studies ranges from 12 (Ackert et al, 2006) to 30 (Chan et al, 2013), while trading period lengths vary 
between 3 (Chan et al 2013) and 6 minutes (Fisher and Kelly, 2000). The parameters chosen for our sessions are 
consistent with the lower end of this range, and represent suitable compromise given constraints posed by 
budgets and time. In particular, we were mindful of avoiding sessions that were “too long” and risked inducing 
boredom in participants, given the repetitive nature of market experiments. 
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rules; participants were allowed to post bids and asks for both assets in separate open order 
books, and accept any posted bid or ask for either asset, subject to the constraints posed by 
their asset holdings and cash balance. All trade occurred in single units, and short-selling and 
buying on margin were not permitted. Trade was conducted in experimental currency called 
‘francs’, with earnings being paid out at the end of the experiment in Australian dollars at a 
pre-announced exchange rate of 200 francs to 1 Australian dollar. The market institution was 
fully computerised using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) – the trading interface is shown in Figure 
1
12
. 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
All traders began the market with the same initial endowment of assets and cash – 5 
units each of X and Y, and 1950 francs. This ensured that the relative position of any trader in 
the market was not affected by the composition of their initial allocation, and also that the 
expected earning opportunities for all traders were initially the same. At the end of each 
trading period, Asset X paid a cash dividend drawn from the distribution {10, 30} with equal 
probability, while Asset Y paid a dividend from the distribution {0, 100} with respective 
probabilities (0.8, 0.2)
13
. These distributions were known to all participants. Dividend draws, 
which were made by the computer, were independent across trading periods and between the 
two types of assets. Any dividend earnings were added to the trader’s cash balance, and their 
end-of-period portfolio carried over to the next trading period.  
                                                     
12
 Note that given the previously documented tendency for trading activity to be biased in favour of the market 
that appears on the left-hand side of the screen (see Chan et al 2013), the market for Asset X was placed on the 
left for roughly half of the sessions in each treatment, and on the right for the remainder. 
13
 These dividend structures mimic that of Ackert et al (2006), who also use a standard/lottery-asset dichotomy, 
albeit with a much more pronounced difference in potential payoffs between the two types. Their ‘standard’ 
asset’s dividend distribution is {0.50, 0.90, 1.2} with respective probabilities (0.48, 0.48, 0.04), while their 
‘lottery’ asset pays a dividend from the distribution {0, 18} with associated probabilities (0.96, 0.04). The 
maximum possible payoff in a period from their lottery asset is 15x the maximum payoff from the standard 
asset, whereas the corresponding multiple in our study is 3.33x. This is intentional, as we wanted participants to 
still view Asset Y as a viable “investment” rather than a purely speculative bet. 
 17 
Note that the expected dividend paid by both X and Y in each period is 20 francs. 
Hence, the risk-neutral fundamental value (FV) of both assets is the same, and is equal to the 
expected total future dividend stream, or 20 multiplied by the number of trading periods 
remaining (including the current period)
14
. As shown by the solid black line in Figure 2, the 
resulting risk-neutral FV process of both assets begins at 240 in period 1 and declines in steps 
of 20 in each period, falling to 20 in period 12 before expiring worthless after the final 
dividend is drawn at the end of period 12. The FV process represents another difference 
between our study and Kleinlercher et al (2014). Whereas we adopt the declining FV 
environment of Smith et al (1988) in line with other experimental research on tournament 
incentives and multi-asset experimental markets, they study experimental assets that have a 
constant FV. In comparison to declining FV markets, constant FV markets of the type 
examined by Kleinlercher et al are less prone to bubble under normal incentives (Smith, van 
Boening, and Wellford 2000). 
Figure 2 also illustrates the largest (dotted line) and smallest (solid line) possible 
cumulative future dividend realisations of each asset in our experiment (X in grey, Y in blue). 
To keep the other features of the graph from being obscured, the step function for the 
maximum possible dividends from asset Y – which potentially pays 100 francs in each period 
– is only partially displayed; the blue dotted line begins at 1200 in period 1 and falls in steps 
of 100 in each ensuing period. In contrast, the minimum possible cumulative dividend 
payment from asset Y is zero, while asset X pays at least 10 and possibly 30 francs in each 
period. These step functions serve to demonstrate that although both asset types have the 
same expected dividend, the variance of Y’s dividend payoff is much greater than X’s. As 
asset X always pays out at least 10 francs in each period, it represents a ‘safe’ investment, 
                                                     
14
 The expected value of the total future dividend stream was common knowledge, and was communicated to 
participants in the form of an “average holding value” table contained within the written instructions given to all 
participants. 
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whereas Y with it lottery-like characteristic is riskier/more speculative. This presence of a 
second, risky/speculative asset in the market environment provides a more natural and 
realistic avenue for traders to increase risk in the hope of greater reward than what the single-
asset environments of earlier tournament studies provide. 
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
The parameters discussed above determine the initial liquidity of our markets, as 
measured by the initial cash-to-assets ratio – the ratio of total cash to the total intrinsic value 
of all assets (X and Y) at the beginning of the market. This ratio was 0.8125 in all sessions, 
allowing us to control for the effects of liquidity on prices, which is known to be positively 
associated with the magnitude of bubbles in experimental markets (Caginalp, Porter and 
Smith 1998, 2000, 2001). While existing experimental studies of tournament incentives and 
multiple assets have used a variety of initial cash-to-asset ratios, our choice of 0.8125 reflects 
the cash-to-assets ratio in the most oft-replicated Smith et al (1988) design, as well as being 
the initial liquidity used by Cheung and Coleman (2014) in their tournament study.       
3.2 Treatments 
3.2.1 James and Isaac tournament contracts 
 To examine the influence of rewards (‘carrots’) and penalties (‘sticks’) in tournament 
contracts, we implemented a between-subjects design with 3 treatments that differ in the way 
participants were remunerated for their performance in the market. In the Baseline or 
‘normal’/linear incentives treatment, participants were compensated on the basis of their 
absolute performance in the market. Since Assets X and Y expired worthless at the end of the 
market, this means that traders were paid their final cash balance
15
.  
                                                     
15
 Ending cash balance  = initial cash balance + dividend earnings + sales revenue – expenditure on purchases 
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 The remaining two treatments invoke tournament incentives. In both the Carrot and 
Stick treatments, we mirrored the approach taken by James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and 
James (2003) by compensating traders on the basis of their performance relative to the 
‘average’ trader. The Carrot compensation contract rewarded above-average performance 
with a bonus payment, while paying all other traders a fixed amount, using the following 
rule: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 = {
3000                                   𝑖𝑓       𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶
∗
3000 + 2(𝐶𝑖 −  𝐶
∗)       𝑖𝑓         𝐶𝑖 ≥ 𝐶
∗ 
 
     
Ci is the final cash balance of trader i and C* is the average of the final cash balances of all 
traders in the market. All units and amount shown are denominated in francs.  
The compensation contract in the Stick treatment introduced an additional component 
to the contract used in the Carrot treatment – a penalty intended to reflect the consequences 
of a scenario where a trader performs so poorly that they lose their job.    
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 = {
0                                            𝑖𝑓                𝐶𝑖 <
1
2
𝐶∗
      3000                                     𝑖𝑓           
1
2
𝐶∗ ≤ 𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
∗
3000 + 2(𝐶𝑖 −  𝐶
∗)           𝑖𝑓                 𝐶𝑖 > 𝐶
∗ 
 
 
While our Carrot contract and the “Bonus” contract used by Kleinlercher et al (2014) 
have similar, convex functional forms, our Stick contract differs markedly from their 
“Penalty” contract, which deducts a proportional penalty from a fixed payment, effectively 
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placing a cap on traders’ earnings16. Hence unlike their study, a comparison between our 
Carrot and Stick treatments indicates only the effect of introducing a penalty for poor 
performance.  
At the end of each trading period, participants in the two tournament treatments were 
given information on-screen about their relative performance. Specifically, they were 
informed of the value of their own Account Total and the average Account Total in their 
market. Based on a measure of the same name used by Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012), 
Account Total is akin to the market value of a trader’s portfolio, and is defined as the sum of 
a trader’s end-of-period cash balance and the value of their end-of-period asset holdings; the 
end-of-period holdings of X and Y in our study were valued at their respective median traded 
prices in that period. Like Cheung and Coleman (2014), we chose the median price in 
preference to the final trading price or highest bid (as used by Schoenberg and Haruvy) 
because it is more difficult for traders to manipulate
17
. Since all assets expired worthless after 
the final dividend payment, the Account Total at the end of period 12 (i.e. at the end of the 
market) reverted to the final cash balance
18
. Traders in the Baseline treatment were also 
informed of their own Account Totals at the end of each trading period, but were not told the 
average in their market. 
3.2.2 Gilpatric tournament contracts 
We also tested two alternative tournament treatments, GilCarrot and GilStick, which 
more closely reflect the type of tournament modelled by Gilpatric (2009). Being rank-order 
tournaments, participants in these treatments were paid a fixed amount determined purely by 
                                                     
16
 That is, the “Penalty” contract used by Kleinlercher et al (2014) is a penalty-only contract, whereas our Stick 
contract is a bonus-and-penalty contract. 
17
 In periods where there was no trade in an asset, the median transaction price was replaced by the median buy 
offer for that asset in the period. This was done to avoid misleading fluctuations in the Account Total, and 
participants were made aware of this before the market began. 
18
 This small change in the definition of the Account Total for period 12 was necessary, since otherwise, it 
would create an incentive for participants to arbitrarily bid up the prices of assets X and Y in period 12 in the 
hope of maximising their Account Totals. 
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their relative position, specifically their final rank. Our GilCarrot contract paid the trader 
with the largest final cash balance 10,000 francs, while all other traders received the 
significantly lower payment of 4000.
19
 The Gilpatric Stick contract is the same, except the 
worst performing trader – the trader with the lowest final cash balance – received nothing 
from the market. Contrast these with the ‘James and Isaac’ tournaments contracts described 
above, where payoffs depend not only on being better/worse than average but also the extent 
to which a trader’s absolute performance exceeds the average. By severing any link between 
absolute performance and compensation, the ‘Gilpatric’ contracts can be considered ‘purer’ 
tournaments, in the Lazear and Rosen (1981) sense, where only relative performance matters. 
Since the appropriate piece of relative-performance information in these treatments is the 
trader’s rank, participants in Gilpatric tournament treatments were informed of their rank at 
the end of each period (calculated on the basis of Account Total), in addition to the other 
relative performance information described above. 
3.3 Procedures 
Each experimental session corresponded to a single treatment to which it (and hence, 
each subject within it) was randomly assigned
20
. Sessions were designed to run two 
independent market-groups of (up to) 8 traders each and ran for approximately 2.5 hours
21
. 
To ensure consistency in the delivery of instructions between sessions and reduce 
experimenter demand effects, all participants received written instructions, which were also 
                                                     
19
 The minimum payment here was set to 4000 francs compared to 3000 francs in the equivalent James and 
Isaac tournament contract Carrot to ensure that the average compensation per trader in real currency, Australian 
dollars, was roughly equal across treatments, and to also conform to the ASB Lab ethics protocol which 
specified an average payment range of $15-20 per hour per participant. 
20
 The only exception to this was a single session where a Carrot treatment market ran alongside a GilStick 
market. The instructions and procedures were appropriately modified for this session to prevent contamination 
of the subject pool. 
21
 That is, excluding the practice period, participants only traded with other participants who were in the same 
market-group. Dividends were also drawn independently for each market-group. 
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communicated verbally by the experiment administrator
22
. Potential interaction effects 
between participants were mitigated by prohibiting subjects from communicating with each 
other for the duration of the experiment.  
The procedure followed in each session was identical, regardless of the treatment. 
Sessions began with participants being randomly allocated to a computer/workstation that 
determined their market-group
23
. They then received training on how to use the trading 
screen to make and accept bids and offers for each asset (10 minutes), following which they 
were given 10 minutes to practise trading using the interface. After the practice period, 
subjects were given further information about the other features of the market environment, 
including how their earnings would be calculated. After this, the market-proper began. Upon 
the conclusion of the market, participants were informed that they would be taking part in 
another 12-period market with the same traders (i.e. market-group). Participants’ inventory of 
assets and cash were reset to their starting levels, and trading commenced for a second round. 
After the end of the second round, participants completed an untimed survey 
consisting of 3 sections
24
. The first section gathered general demographic information about 
participants and their experiences and thought-processes during the market(s)
25
. The second 
and third sections, which form part of a related study, comprise the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) and Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale. The CRT is a measure of 
cognitive ability developed by Frederick (2005) that consists of 3 problem-solving type 
questions that assess the ability of respondents to reject an impulsive and intuitive incorrect 
                                                     
22
 To ensure consistency with the procedures used in the existing literature, the written protocol was adapted 
from those used by Dufwenberg et al (2005), Noussair et al (2001), Noussair and Powell (2010), Lugovskyy et 
al (2009), Childs and Mestelman (2006), and Cheung and Coleman (2014). Participants were also given time to 
read the instructions on their own, and to ask any clarifying questions privately (which were also answered 
privately). The written protocol can be found in Appendix B. 
23
 The workstation number also served as a participant’s ID, thus ensuring the anonymity of their data. 
24
 The survey was initially paper-based (9 sessions), but was computerised using the Qualtrics survey software 
and administered electronically in the October and November sessions (10 sessions). 
25
 This is a modified version of the end-of-experiment questionnaire used by Ackert and Church (2001). 
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answer in favour of a correct answer that requires more deliberation. In addition to general 
measures of cognitive ability, performance in the CRT is correlated with time and risk 
preferences (Frederick 2005), as well as certain behavioural biases (Oechssler, Roider, and 
Schmitz 2009). The 30-item DOSPERT Scale, designed by Blais and Weber (2006), is a 
psychometric scale that measures risk preferences and perceptions across five separate 
decision-making domains: Financial (split into Investing and Gambling), Health/Safety, 
Recreational, Ethical, and Social
26
. Respondents use a 7-point scale to rate the likelihood of 
their participation (Part 1), the perceived riskiness (Part 2), and the benefits expected to 
accrue (Part 3) from engaging in 30 different domain-specific risky activities. Of course, 
administering the DOSPERT Scale after the market stage carries with it the risk that 
responses may be influenced by participants’ experiences during the market. However, given 
our main objective is to study price behaviour, this is the ‘lesser of two evils’, as the 
alternative of implementing the scale before the market could in turn influence participants’ 
trading behaviour. A summary of the demographic characteristics of the subject pool, CRT 
scores (out of 3), and DOSPERT likelihood/preference scores in the most relevant domain, 
Financial (ranges from 6 to 42, higher scores indicate greater willingness to take financial 
risks), is presented in Table 1, categorised by treatment.   
Once the surveys were completed, participants were called up individually, paid their 
earnings (in envelopes) and dismissed. Participants’ total earnings from the experiment were 
calculated as the sum of their earnings from both rounds of the market, converted to 
Australian dollars, plus a $5 participation fee. The average payment to participants, inclusive 
of the participation fee, was $49. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
                                                     
26
 Compared to the original 40-item DOSPERT scale (Weber, Blais and Betz 2002), which was developed for 
American undergraduate college students, the revised 30-item DOSPERT scale (Weber and Blais 2006) is 
designed to be more readily applicable to a more diverse range of cultures, age groups, and educational levels. 
Consequently, we chose the latter. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Inexperienced Traders 
4.1.1 Descriptive Summary 
 Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 chart the time-path of the median transaction price of 
assets X and Y respectively in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments during the first 
round of the market; for each treatment, the charted price in each period is the median of the 
median transaction prices from all markets in that treatment. Median prices in Figure 3 for 
both assets in all treatments broadly follow the pattern associated with Smith et al (1988)-
type markets populated with inexperienced traders – prices start below fundamental value and 
remain there in the initial periods before rising above fundamental value. However, with the 
possible exception of asset Y in the Stick treatment, which experiences a precipitous fall in 
median price from periods 7 to 8, the characteristic bubble-and-crash is notably missing. In 
fact, median prices in the Carrot treatment can hardly be described to ‘bubble’ at all, though 
it should be noted that these graphs hide considerable heterogeneity at the individual market 
level. In fact, bubbles-and-crashes were observed in individual markets of all treatments, 
although they did not occur with the regularity reported in other studies of multi-asset 
experimental markets such as Fisher and Kelly (2000).  
Perhaps the most notable feature of Figure 3 is the persistently higher median 
prices/more pronounced overvaluation exhibited by the Stick treatment in comparison to the 
Carrot treatment. In fact, median prices are higher in the Stick treatment in every trading 
period for the more speculative asset Y, and in all bar 1 period for asset X. A Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney (WMW) U test – the non-parametric equivalent of the independent samples t-
test – reveals that these differences are significant at the 5% level in period 2 though to 6 in 
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asset X, and in periods 2 and 5 for asset Y
27
. Furthermore, it is the Carrot treatment where 
prices appear to most closely conform to fundamental value, even in comparison to the 
normal-incentive Baseline treatment, which can be tentatively described as charting a path in 
between the two tournament contract treatments, particularly for asset X. These observations 
run contrary to the notions that tournaments necessarily distort prices, and that rewards 
(penalties) encourage (discourage) the formation of bubbles. Moreover, they also present a 
sharp contrast to Kleinlercher et al (2014), who find that average prices for their “high-risk” 
(equivalent to our asset Y) asset are highest under their “Bonus” treatment and lowest in their 
“Penalty” treatment.    
Figure 3 also reveals a high degree of correlation in the prices of assets X and Y, 
which is consistent with behaviour observed in earlier studies of multi-asset markets (e.g. 
Fisher and Kelly 2000, Childs and Mestelman 2006), where relative prices between asset-
types tend to remain close to the ‘correct’ value (i.e. risk-neutral value) even when individual 
assets exhibit severe mispricing. This is more clearly illustrated by Figure 4, which graphs the 
median Prediction Error in each period for each treatment. Like Fisher and Kelly (2000), we 
define the Prediction Error in each period of an individual market as the percentage deviation 
of the relative price of asset Y (median price of Y divided by the median price of X in that 
period) from the risk-neutral benchmark (equal to 1 in this study)
28
. More positive (negative) 
values indicate a greater willingness by market participants to pay a premium to acquire the 
riskier (less risky) asset Y (X). As Figure 4 illustrates, median prediction errors in all 
treatments remain relatively close to zero throughout the market.  
                                                     
27
 While we do not report full results here, the two-sided p-values in periods 2-6 for asset X are 0.045, 0.049, 
0.048, 0.024, and 0.027. For asset Y, the p-values in period 2 and 5 are 0.014 and 0.046 respectively. In 
addition, median transaction prices for asset Y are higher in the Stick treatment than the Carrot treatment at the 
10% level in periods 1 and 6 (p-value = 0.094 and 0.066 respectively). 
28
 Unlike Fisher and Kelly (2000), we report the median of the Prediction Errors across all sessions/markets 
rather than the average, due to the lower sensitivity of the median to outliers in small samples. 
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Furthermore, mirroring the approach of Brown et al (1996) by comparing the first and 
second half of the market in Figure 4 does not indicate the presence of an obvious 
‘tournament effect’ in the two tournament treatments. The effect we seek to detect here is 
heightened ‘risk-seeking’ behaviour by traders in the second half of the market, as evidenced 
by a substantial rise in the price of Y relative to X
29
. Instead, we see that relative prices in 
Carrot and Stick behave similarly in both halves – the average of the median Prediction 
Errors in the Carrot treatment in periods 1-6 is 1% vs. 2.2% in periods 7-12, while the 
corresponding values for the Stick treatment are 1% and 2.4%. In contrast, the average of the 
median Prediction Errors during the first half of the market in the Baseline treatment is -
0.2%, compared to 10% in the second half, potentially indicating that participants were 
willing to pay more to acquire the riskier asset Y in the latter stages of the market. Note 
however that the desire to move up the leaderboard is unlikely to be an adequate explanation 
for this apparent risk-seeking behaviour since relative performance information was not 
shown to participants in the Baseline treatment
30
.  
< Insert Figure 3 about here > 
< Insert Figure 4 about here > 
4.1.2 Statistical Analysis 
Bubble Measures  
To conduct a more formal comparison of the treatments, we calculate a number of 
measures of mispricing/bubbles that are frequently used in the experimental asset market 
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 Of course, Brown et al (1996) were concerned with adjustments made by individual fund managers in 
portfolio risk between the two halves of the year rather than an aggregate metric like relative price. 
30
 Having said that, it is possible that even if relative performance information is not provided, participants have 
an internalised benchmark of what “average” performance looks like, and hence whether they are performing 
better or worse. 
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literature. These bubble measures can broadly be categorised into two groups that assess two 
different dimensions of mispricing – magnitude and length.  
Amplitude (Haruvy and Noussair 2006), the first of the magnitude measures, 
quantifies the extent to which average prices in a market change relative to FV. It is 
calculated as max 𝑡{(?̅?𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡) 𝐹𝑡⁄ } − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡{(?̅?𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡) 𝐹𝑡⁄ }, where the largest and smallest 
deviations of average price Pt from fundamental value Ft are normalised by the FV in the 
respective period t. Large values of this measure indicate big swings in price relative to FV 
and hence the possible presence of a bubble. Total Dispersion (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) 
measures the aggregate absolute deviation of median price from FV across all trading 
periods, and is defined as ∑ |𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡|𝑡 . Since it treats both positive and negative 
deviations from FV identically, it is a measure of aggregate mispricing rather than over or 
undervaluation, with smaller values indicating a closer correspondence between price and 
fundamental value. Turnover, a normalised measure of trading activity, is used as a measure 
of magnitude since bubble are typically associated with higher trading volumes. We calculate 
turnover as defined by King, Smith, Williams, and van Boening (1993), namely 
∑ 𝑉𝑡𝑡 (𝑇𝑆𝑈)⁄ , where Vt, the volume of trade in period t is normalised by TSU, the total 
number of units of the asset (X or Y) in the market. Normalised Deviation, measured by 
Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) as ∑ 𝑉𝑡|𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡| (𝑇𝑆𝑈)⁄𝑡 , combines the 
preceding two measures to account for both the size of the price deviation and the level of 
trading activity in a market. To examine how closely prices track changes in FV, we calculate 
Haessel-R
2
 (Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore 2005), which is the R-squared from the 
regression of average prices on fundamental values. Being a goodness-of-fit measure, it 
conveys how much of the variation in average price across periods is explained by changes in 
FV; values closer to 0 (1) suggest the potential existence (absence) of price bubbles. Note that 
none of the aforementioned measures determine whether the asset is generally overvalued or 
 28 
undervalued. To gauge the degree of overpricing/underpricing, we calculate Average Bias 
(Haruvy and Noussair 2006), which measures how far median prices on average deviate from 
FV over the course of the market, and is calculated as 
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1 . Large 
positive (negative) values suggest that prices tend to stay above (below) FV. Values close to 
zero may suggest that prices stay close to FV or that the asset experiences equal degrees of 
over and underpricing in the market; assessing the Average Bias in conjunction with Total 
Dispersion helps to shed light in this regard, since observing a small (large) Total Dispersion 
at the same time as a near-zero Average Bias would imply the former (latter) (Haruvy and 
Noussair 2006). 
The first of the bubble-length measures, Duration (Porter and Smith 1995), calculates 
the maximum number of consecutive periods where average price increases relative to 
fundamental value, or 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑚: ?̅?𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 < ?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝐹𝑡+1 < ⋯ < ?̅?𝑡+𝑚 − 𝐹𝑡+𝑚}. Larger values 
of Duration point to sustained periods where changes in (average) transaction price across 
trading periods do not ‘adequately’ track changes in the FV, potentially indicating the 
presence of a bubble. Boom (Bust) Duration (Haruvy and Noussair 2006) is defined as the 
maximum number of consecutive periods where median prices stay above (stay below) FV; 
large values indicate long periods of overvaluation (undervaluation), potentially signalling 
the presence (absence) of a bubble. 
The Behaviour of Individual Assets 
Panels A and B of Table 2 report the median values of the bubble measures in each 
treatment for assets X and Y respectively in Round 1, along with the associated median 
absolute deviations
31
. For each asset-type, each measure produces one observation per 
                                                     
31
 The median absolute deviation (MAD) is measure of spread of a distribution, and is calculated as the median 
of the absolute deviations of all values in a sample from the median. We report the median value and MAD of 
each measure in preference to the mean and standard deviation due to the small number of observations 
involved, and their lower sensitivity to outliers. 
 29 
market; hence the medians are based on 7 observations in the Baseline treatment, and 8 
observations each in the Carrot and Stick treatments
32
. The bottom half of each panel reports 
two-sided exact p-values from Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U (WMW) tests of the differences 
in the measures between treatments, under the null that the values from both treatments come 
from the same distribution. The WMW test, which is a non-parametric test, is the appropriate 
statistical test given the small sample size.  
We begin by comparing the two tournament treatments, Carrot and Stick (i.e. 
Hypothesis 3). In the case of the ‘safe’ asset, X, the differences between the Carrot and Stick 
treatments on most bubble measures are not statistically significant. Of the magnitude 
measures, only Turnover is marginally significantly lower in the Stick treatment compared to 
Carrot (p-value = 0.065), which lends some support to the notion that penalties embedded in 
tournament contracts inhibit speculation. However, the bubble-length measures present the 
opposite story, with significantly longer Boom Durations (p-value = 0.007) and significantly 
shorter Bust Durations (p-value = 0.039) in the Stick treatment indicative of more prolonged 
periods of overvaluation compared to the Carrot treatment; the median market in the Stick 
(Carrot) treatment experiences 10 (3.5) consecutive periods where the median price of X 
exceeds fundamental value, and only 1.5 (4.5) consecutive periods below fundamental value. 
For the riskier asset Y, the degree of mispricing is comparable to asset X, as 
suggested by the similarity in the median bubble measure values between the two assets-
types in each tournament treatment. Like asset X, Turnover for asset Y is significantly higher 
in the Carrot treatment (p-value = 0.038), while Boom Duration is again significantly longer 
in the Stick treatment (p-value = 0.022). In addition, prices for Asset Y are also significantly 
lower in the Carrot treatment according to the Average Bias measure (p-value = 0.028), 
                                                     
32
 The bubble measure values observed in the individual markets of each treatment are tabled in Appendix A. 
See Table A1 and A2 for the values from Round 1. 
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which shows that Asset Y is on average overvalued by 25 francs in each period under Stick 
incentives, whereas Carrot incentives are associated with asset Y being undervalued on 
average by almost 10 francs per period. This difference in Average Bias between the two 
tournament treatments is also mirrored in asset X, however the failure to attain statistical 
significance there is due to greater noise in the Carrot treatment.  
Taken as a whole, the bubble measures are consistent with our observations from 
Figure 3. They reveal that when penalties are embedded into tournament contracts that 
reward participants for beating the ‘market’, inexperienced traders trade less compared to 
reward-only contracts. However, the trade that does occur actually happens at higher prices, 
and periods of overvaluation last longer, especially in the riskier asset. Thus, rather than 
curtailing the impetus to speculate on riskier ventures, our findings mostly suggest that the 
addition of a ‘stick’ achieves the opposite result. While we do not examine individual-level 
behaviour in this study, these results are consistent with pricing expected under the herding 
hypothesis (Rajan 2006; Dass et al 2008).  
Like Kleinlercher et al (2014), our results appear to be driven by the attendant 
incentives and not by differences between the treatments in participants’ inherent risk 
attitudes – average DOSPERT scores in the Financial domain (or its subsets), though 
collected after the market stage, do not differ significantly between Carrot and Stick markets 
(WMW test p-value (two-sided) = 0.529, nCarrot = nStick = 8); nor are they driven by 
differences in cognitive ability, as measured by CRT scores (WMW test p-value (two-sided) 
= 0.6, nCarrot = nStick = 8)
33
. However, while our findings here coincide with Kleinlercher et al 
regarding trading volumes, they contrast strongly with respect to the degree of mispricing 
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 Debate surrounding the collection of the DOSPERT/CRT data before or after the market is in some ways 
moot, since random assignment of participants to treatments should ensure that the treatment groups are on 
average ‘equivalent’ at the outset of the experiment. Nonetheless, we tested for differences as an additional 
safety measure. Though we do not report the full results here (available upon request), we do not find a 
significant difference between any of the treatments in the CRT scores (market average or individual) or 
DOSPERT scores (market average or individual). 
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observed in the riskier asset; overvaluation (calculated similarly to Average Bias) in their 
“high-risk” asset is greatest in their “Bonus” treatment and lowest in their “Penalty” 
treatment
34
. Since the absence of relative performance evaluation reduces the inclination to 
herd, a possible explanation for this stark difference between our studies lies in the non-
competitive incentives faced by their traders. This, combined with the penalty-only 
nature/framing of their “Penalty” contract, may focus participants’ thoughts on avoiding the 
uncertainty associated with the riskier asset, as there is no competition to beat or ‘reward’ to 
be gained. Moreover, while we do not speculate on the precise mechanism, the constant FV 
process used by Kleinlercher et al may also play a part.   
Comparing the tournament treatments to the normal incentive Baseline treatments 
(Hypothesis 1) in Table 2 is also revealing. For both assets X and Y, we fail to find a 
significant difference between Baseline and the two tournament treatments on any of the 
bubble-magnitude measures. Of the bubble-length measures, Boom Duration is smaller in the 
Baseline treatment than the Stick treatment for asset X, but only marginally so (p-value = 
0.081), while being significantly larger in the Baseline treatment compared to the Carrot 
treatment for asset Y (p-value = 0.013). This mostly runs contrary to much of the evidence 
from single-asset experimental studies going back to James and Isaac (2000) that find 
tournament incentives to be associated with significantly larger bubble. Hence, our results 
suggest that the findings of these earlier studies may be an artefact of speculation in a single-
asset environment. When inexperienced traders are given the ability to bet on a higher payoff 
from an alternate, risky asset, tournament incentives do not distort prices any more than 
normal incentives. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
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 For their “low-risk” asset (equivalent to asset X in our study), Kleinlercher et al (2014) report significantly 
lower (higher) average prices in their ‘Penalty’ (‘Linear’ incentives) treatment compared other treatments, 
although the differences are not economically significant – the price paths in all their treatments for the low-risk 
asset are very similar. 
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Relative Prices 
Turning to relative prices, Panel A of Table 3 shows the median value of the Average 
Prediction Error in each treatment, along with the associated median absolute deviations. 
Average Prediction Error is identical to the ‘overall normalised exchange rate deviation’ 
measure used by Fisher and Kelly (2000), and is calculated by averaging the Prediction 
Errors (defined above) in all periods of a session/market. Like the bubble measures, this 
yields one observation per market. The table reports median Average Prediction Errors based 
on the entire duration of a market (“Avg PredErr”), as well as in each half of the market 
(“Avg PredErr_p1to6” and “Avg PredErr_p7to12).  
Looking at the whole-of-market measure (“Avg PredErr”), we see that the median 
values are very similar – around 3% – in all three treatments. In fact, the median values are 
not significantly different from zero in any of the treatments, which is consistent with other 
multi-asset studies that find relative prices do not significantly deviate from the risk-neutral 
theoretical value when assets are differentiated by the variance of payoffs alone (Ackert et al 
2006, Childs and Mestelman 2006)
35,36
. However, this contrasts again with Kleinlercher et al 
(2014), whose high-risk asset sells at a significant premium to the low-risk asset in their 
“Bonus” and the normal-incentive “Linear” treatments, while the opposite holds true in their 
“Penalty” treatment.  
To examine if relative prices behave differently between the first and second half of 
the market – specifically due to heightened speculation on the risky asset in the second half – 
we compare the measures corresponding to each half within treatments. We use a Wilcoxon 
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 The statistical significance of the median Average Prediction Error in each treatment is assessed using the 
one-sample Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, under the null that the median is equal to zero. It is the non-parametric 
equivalent of the one-sample t-test. 
36
 However, this result contrasts with Fisher and Kelly (2000) who report that their riskier asset sells at a slight 
premium to the safer asset, although they do not obtain enough observations to make a formal statistical 
comparison. In addition, their results are potentially confounded by the differing levels of experience of some 
traders in their markets. Ackert et al (2006) find a preference for assets with lottery-like payoffs only when trade 
occurs with borrowed money. 
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Signed-rank test to examine the one-sided alternative hypothesis that Average Prediction 
Errors in the second half of the market are higher than in the first half; the corresponding p-
values (one-sided) are reported in the right-most column of Panel A
37
.  The results do not 
provide compelling evidence of a ‘tournament effect’ in relative prices in Round 1. Although 
median Average Prediction Errors are larger in all treatments in the second half, these 
differences are only statistically significant in the normal-incentive Baseline treatment 
(median Average Prediction Error is -0.32% in 1
st
 half vs. 7.88% in 2
nd
 median), but only at 
the 10% level (p-value (one-sided) = 0.064).  
The bottom of Panel A reports exact p-values (two-sided) from WMW tests 
comparing the measures between treatment-pairs. The null hypothesis is that values in both 
treatments come from the same distribution. The failure to achieve statistical significance on 
any of the tests means that we do not find support for the conjecture that tournament 
incentives have a significant impact on relative prices compared to normal incentives 
(Hypothesis 1), or that relative prices in Carrot markets behave differently to Stick markets 
(Hypothesis 3).  
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
4.2 The Effect of Experience 
Individual Assets 
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of median transaction prices for assets X and Y (panels 
(a) and (b) respectively) in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments during the second round 
of trading. With once-experienced traders, we see that the difference in price behaviour, in 
particular between the two tournament treatments is much less obvious compared to Round 1 
(cf. Figure 3). The convergence between two is especially pronounced in the case of the risky 
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 The (paired-sample) Wilcoxon Signed-rank test is the non-parametric equivalent of the paired t-test. The null 
hypothesis is that values from both groups come from the same distribution. 
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asset Y, where in a reversal of Round 1, the Stick treatments appears to conform more closely 
to fundamental value than Carrot. And although median prices for asset X are again higher in 
the Stick treatment compared to the Carrot treatment in most trading periods, the differences 
do not appear to be as great as in Round 1, especially in the early and latter stages of the 
market. In fact, in contrast to Round 1, the differences in median price between the Carrot 
and Stick treatment are not statistically significant in any trading period, for both assets 
(unreported WMW tests). Furthermore, notwithstanding the considerable heterogeneity in 
price behaviour at the individual market level, it is the Baseline treatment where median 
prices exhibit the most obvious bubble – Asset Y – resulting in median prices for Y that are 
significantly higher than the Carrot treatment at the peak of the bubble in periods 7 and 8.
38
 
< Insert Figure 5 about here > 
The bubble measures corroborate these observations. Median values of the bubble 
measures in each treatment in Round 2, along with exact p-values (two-sided) from the 
associated WMW tests are detailed in Table 4
39
. For asset X (Panel A), relative median 
values on most bubble measures point to greater mispricing and overvaluation in the Stick 
treatment compared to the Carrot treatment, whereas the opposite holds true for asset Y 
(Panel B). However, on most measures, these differences in median values between the two 
treatments are smaller in Round 2 compared to Round 1. More importantly, in contrast to 
Round 1, we fail to reject the null of no difference between the Carrot and Stick treatments 
(Hypothesis 3) on any of the measures for either asset X or Y. 
Comparing the Baseline treatment against the tournament treatments (Hypothesis 1), 
we do not find a significant difference in Round 2 between the Baseline treatment and the 
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 WMW test p-values are 0.045, and 0.048 in periods 7 and 8 respectively. The Baseline treatment also 
registers a significantly higher median price than Carrot in asset Y in period 3 (p-value = 0.049). 
39
 Refer to Table A3 and A4 in Appendix A for the values of the bubble measures in each individual market of 
these treatments. 
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two tournament treatments in any of the bubble measures for asset X. For the riskier asset Y, 
all of the median bubble-measure values, with the exception of Turnover, indicate greater 
mispricing/bubble behaviour in the Baseline treatment than in either the Carrot or Stick 
treatments. Of these however, the only difference that is significant at the 5% level is in 
Boom Duration, which is smaller in the Stick treatment (medianBaseline = 7 vs. medianStick = 3, 
p-value = 0.035). Average Bias is also higher in Baseline than in the Carrot treatment, but is 
only marginally significant (medianBaseline = 24.33 vs. medianCarrot = 1.08, p-value = 0.094).  
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Hence, aggregate-level differences between the incentive schemes seem to largely 
dissipate when traders are experienced in relation to the experimental design (and their 
trading cohort). To help understand what drives this, Figures 6 and 7 compare, by treatment, 
the evolution of median prices in the two rounds for assets X and Y respectively. While it is 
difficult to make strong conclusions based on these figures, it is notable that the most striking 
change between rounds occurs in the Stick treatment for asset Y, where median prices are 
lower in most periods and adhere much more closely to FV in Round 2. Improved adherence 
to fundamental value in Round 2, particularly in the early stages of the market, is also evident 
for asset X in both the Carrot and Stick treatments. Median prices for asset X in the latter 
treatment also appear to adjust more quickly and successfully to fundamental value towards 
the end of the market. In contrast, median prices for asset Y in the Baseline and Carrot 
treatments seem to conform less well to FV with experienced traders, especially in the second 
half of the market. 
< Insert Figure 6 about here > 
< Insert Figure 7 about here > 
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We formally assess if price behaviour changes significantly between rounds within 
each treatment (i.e. Hypothesis 2) by conducting Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests on the various 
bubble measures; the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the bubble measure 
between rounds. The two-sided p-values from these tests are shown in Table 5. Beginning 
with Panel A, which corresponds to the ‘safe’ asset X, we see that the Baseline treatment 
shows no significant change in behaviour between the two rounds on any of the measures. In 
contrast, the results point to an ‘improvement’ in price behaviour in the two tournament 
treatments, with a number of bubble measures indicative of significantly reduced 
mispricing/bubble behaviour. This is especially the case in the Stick treatment, where Boom 
Duration and Turnover are both significantly smaller in Round 2 (p-value = 0.014 and 0.03 
respectively), Haessel-R
2
 is significantly larger (p-value = 0.036), while Normalised 
Deviation and Bust Duration show improvements that are marginally significant (p-value = 
0.093 and 0.078 respectively)
40
. These improvements help drive the trend to insignificance 
between the Stick and Carrot treatments in Round 2 for asset X. Even in the Carrot 
treatment, where median prices conform relatively well to FV in the first round of trading and 
hence the scope for ‘improvement’ is more limited, we see that Turnover and Normalised 
Deviation are both significantly lower in Round 2 for asset X (p-value = 0.012 for both 
measures). The significance of the latter measure appears to be driven by the decline in 
Turnover however, since Total Dispersion is not significantly different between the two 
rounds. 
The moderating effect of experience on mispricing/bubbles under tournament 
incentives is also seen in the riskier asset, Y (Panel B). They confirm what Figure 7 strongly 
suggests – that the price behaviour of asset Y in the Stick treatment shows marked 
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 Even though the median value of Normalised Deviation for asset X in the Stick treatment is higher in Round 
2 than in Round 1, the sign-rank test nonetheless reveals a marginally significant improvement because the 
Round 2 value of this measure is actually lower than the corresponding Round 1 value in 6 out of 8 markets. 
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improvement in its adherence to FV in Round 2. We see improvement in all of the bubble 
measures over the two rounds, significantly in the case of Turnover (p-value = 0.036) and the 
bubble-length measures, Duration (p-value = 0.031), Boom Duration (p-value = 0.011), and 
Bust Duration (p-value = 0.019). The adjustment is particularly large in the case of Boom 
Duration, where the median value falls from 8 to 3 periods. This primarily drives the shift to 
insignificance (significance) for the Stick treatment on this measure with respect to the Carrot 
(Baseline) treatment, where the same measure does not change significantly between rounds.  
Despite the impression created by Figure 7 that prices for asset Y in the Carrot 
treatment are distorted more by experience, we do not find any evidence supporting this in 
the bubble measures. In fact, the median values of most bubble measures suggest less 
distortion in Round 2, significantly in the case of Duration (p-value = 0.013) and Turnover 
(p-value = 0.013), and marginally significantly for Total Dispersion (p-value = 0.093). The 
composite measure of Turnover and Total Dispersion, Normalised Deviation, is also 
significantly smaller with experienced traders (p-value = 0.012).  
Once again, the effect of experience is least pronounced in the Baseline treatment. 
Indeed, consistent with Figure 7, most bubble measures for asset Y in this treatment actually 
‘worsen’ in Round 2, although the deterioration is only significant in one measure – Total 
Dispersion – and that too only marginally so (p-value = 0.091). The only measure to achieve 
significance at the 5% level is Turnover, which like the two tournament treatments, is 
actually significantly reduced by experience (p-value = 0.018). 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
Thus, the trend towards convergence in price behaviour between the treatments as 
participants gain experience is primarily driven by the reduction in mispricing/bubbles in the 
two tournament treatments, especially in the Stick treatment. This result contrasts strongly 
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with James and Isaac (2000) and Cheung and Coleman (2014), who find that prices under 
tournament incentives diverge more from fundamental value (i.e. bubbles become larger) as 
traders gain experience. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy lies in a crucial 
difference between these earlier studies and ours – they examine single-asset environments, 
whereas participants in our markets trade two differentiated risky assets. Hence, our result 
suggests that the number of assets available for trade also plays an important role in 
determining how trading experience interacts with tournament incentives in affecting prices. 
Relative Prices 
Having examined how experience affects the prices of individual assets, we now turn 
to its impact on relative prices. Figure 8 shows the median Prediction Error in each period 
for each treatment in Round 2. The most interesting aspect of this chart and the most obvious 
change from Round 1 (cf. Fig. 4) is that the Carrot treatment exhibits a pronounced upward 
trajectory in the second half of the market, particularly in the last 3 periods. Participants in 
the median Carrot market were willing to pay a 63% premium to acquire asset Y relative the 
price paid for X in the final period. Furthermore, the average of the median Prediction Errors 
in the Carrot treatment in the first 6 periods is -12.2% compared to 16.4% in the final six. 
This is consistent with tournament-induced risk-seeking by traders who are hoping to 
improve their rankings as the end of the market approaches by betting on receiving the 
relatively large dividend that asset Y provides. In contrast, relative prices do not seem to 
behave in an overtly similar manner in the Baseline and Stick treatments in Figure 8, with 
median Prediction Errors for both treatments staying in the region of zero in all periods. 
< Insert Figure 8 about here > 
Panel B of Table 3, which reports the results of statistical tests on the Average 
Prediction Errors in Round 2, confirms the changing behaviour of relative prices within the 
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Carrot treatment – the median Average Prediction Error in the second half of the market 
(15.04%) is significantly larger (one-sided p-value = 0.013) than the corresponding value for 
the first half of the market (-12.70%). The fact that we also observe a similar effect in the 
Baseline treatment (one-sided p-value = 0.032), albeit one that is smaller – median Average 
Prediction Error in periods 1-6 is -0.12% vs. 5.23% in periods 7-12 – indicates that this not a 
purely ‘tournament’ phenomenon. However, the larger magnitude of the difference in the 
Carrot treatment suggests that competitive incentives may play an amplifying role. As for 
why such an effect appears with experienced traders even though it is missing in Round 1, we 
posit that a possible explanation could be that traders become more aware of the strategic use 
of the riskier asset Y as they become more familiar with the trading environment and 
dividend structures of the two assets
41
.  
Unlike the two other treatments, the Stick treatment does not show a significant 
difference in relative price behaviour between the two halves of the market. Moreover, when 
relative prices are examined over course of the entire market, the whole-of-market Average 
Prediction Error (‘Avg PredErr’) in all three treatments is not significantly different from 
zero (i.e. relative prices conform to the theoretical value ‘on average’). For the Carrot 
treatment, this result arises because the statistically significant and large relative discount for 
asset Y in the first half of the market (one-sample Wilcoxon Signed-rank p-value = 0.0499) is 
offset by the (marginally) significant and large premium in the second (one-sample Wilcoxon 
Signed-rank p-value = 0.093). Furthermore, we do not detect a significant difference between 
any of the treatments on the whole-of-market measure, and we also fail to reject the null of no 
difference between the treatments in the measures corresponding to each half of the market. 
Hence, like Round 1, relative prices in our treatments do not appear to behave significantly 
differently from each other. 
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 Of course, it is possible that there is a similar difference in the behaviour of relative prices in Round 1, but 
our test lacks the power to detect it. 
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4.3 Gilpatric Contracts 
Individual Assets 
Panels A and B of Figure 9 (10) compare the price behaviour of asset X (Y) in the 
Carrot and Stick treatments against their respective rank-order tournament equivalents, 
GilCarrot and GilStick in Round 1. These figures reveal that median prices in the rank-order 
tournaments and their James & Isaac tournament counterparts are generally closely 
associated, especially in the case of the penalty-based contracts (Stick and GilStick). 
However, the relationship does not appear to be as close between the reward-only treatments, 
where GilCarrot produces higher median prices than the Carrot treatment in most periods. 
Except for the first period, these differences are generally small or negligible in asset Y but 
are larger and more persistent in asset X
42
. As a consequence, the noticeable difference in 
median prices that exists between the Carrot and Stick treatments in inexperienced markets 
(see Fig. 3) is greatly diminished in the case of GilCarrot and GilStick, as shown in panels A 
and B of Figure 11. 
< Insert Figure 9 about here > 
< Insert Figure 10 about here > 
< Insert Figure 11 about here > 
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 Median prices for asset X in the GilCarrot treatment are significantly higher than Carrot in periods 9 and 12, 
but only at the 10% level (WMW p-value = 0.07 and 0.092 respectively). Unreported WMW tests comparing 
bubble measures between the Carrot and GilCarrot treatments show that GilCarrot has a longer Boom Duration 
that is marginally significant (p-value = 0.064) for asset X; all other measures for asset X return insignificant 
differences, while there are no significant differences between Carrot and GilCarrot on any measures for asset 
Y. Similarly, Stick and GilStick do not show significant differences on any of the bubble measures for either 
asset, except the trading activity measure Turnover, which is marginally significantly higher in the GilStick 
treatment for asset X (p-value = 0.053). 
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The bubble measures from the rank-order tournaments in Round 1 are summarised in 
Table 6, along with exact p-values (two-sided) from the corresponding WMW tests
43
. 
Consistent with the visual data, and in contrast to the James & Isaac tournament contracts (cf. 
Table 2), we do not detect, for either asset-type, a significant difference between GilCarrot 
and GilStick on any of the bubble measures (Hypothesis 3). Relative to the James & Isaac 
tournaments, Table 6 is also somewhat more supportive of the argument that tournament 
contracts distort prices more than normal incentives (Hypothesis 1) – Haessel-R2 is higher, 
and Turnover and Normalised Deviation are both significantly lower in the Baseline 
treatment than in the GilCarrot treatment, albeit only marginally (p-values of 0.051, 0.073, 
and 0.073 respectively), and only for asset X. Given that we fail to find a significant 
difference in Total Dispersion between Baseline and GilCarrot, it is also likely that the 
difference in Normalised Deviation simply reflects the same effect as Turnover. 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
In markets with experienced traders (Round 2), we see in Figure 12 that differences in 
median price between GilCarrot and GilStick appear to be greater for asset Y than X. Indeed, 
median prices in the GilStick treatment exhibit a sizeable bubble in asset Y. However as 
Table 7 reveals, like Round 1, none of the bubble measures for asset Y in Round 2 differ 
significantly between the two rank-order tournament treatments. Also, with the exception of 
Amplitude, which is marginally significantly greater in the GilCarrot treatment than in 
GilStick (p-value = 0.065), all other bubble measures for asset X return insignificant 
differences. In regards to the Baseline treatment, we fail to find a significant difference on 
any of the bubble measures with respect to the GilCarrot or GilStick treatments for either 
asset.  
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 Refer to Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A for the values of the bubble measures in the individual markets of 
these treatments. Round 2 equivalents can be found in Tables A3 and A4. 
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< Insert Figure 12 about here > 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
As with the James & Issac tournaments, we find that greater trading experience is 
associated with smaller bubbles under rank-order tournament conditions, especially in the 
GilStick treatment (Hypothesis 2). The results (two-sided p-values) of Signed-rank tests 
carried out on the bubble measures of each rank-order tournament treatment are shown in 
Table 8. The table reveals that for asset X (Panel A) in the GilStick treatment, Amplitude and 
Total Dispersion are significantly smaller in Round 2 (p-value = 0.028 and 0.046 
respectively), while Normalised Deviation, Duration, and Boom Duration are also smaller 
but only at the 10% level  (p-value = 0.075, 0.091, and 0.058 respectively). For asset Y 
(Panel B) in the GilStick treatment, Turnover is significantly reduced by experience (p-value 
= 0.046), while smaller Amplitudes and Durations in Round 2 are marginally significant (p-
value = 0.075 and 0.058 respectively). On the other hand, the evidence that experience 
reduces mispricing/bubbles is weaker in the GilCarrot treatment, where the only measure that 
changes significantly between rounds is the trading activity measure, Turnover, which is 
smaller in Round 2 for both assets (p-value = 0.028 in both cases). Importantly however, 
none of the bubble measures in either rank-order tournament treatment indicate significantly 
more mispricing as participants gain experience. 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
Relative Prices 
Relative prices in the Gilpatric tournaments in Round 1 behave in a qualitatively 
similar manner to the James and Isaac tournaments. That is, on ‘average’, relative prices 
conform to the theoretical value and do not differ significantly between the two treatments, 
GilCarrot and GilStick. This can be seen in Figure 13(a), where the median Prediction Error 
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in both treatments is close to zero in most periods. Consistent with this, in both treatments we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that the median Average Prediction Error, summarised in 
Panel A of Table 9, is equal to zero. This is also the case for the two half-market measures. 
Moreover, within each rank-order tournament treatment, we do not detect a significant 
difference in relative-price behaviour between the first and second halves of the market. 
Furthermore, the differences between GilCarrot and GilStick, assessed using the WMW test, 
are not statistically significant on any of the measures, nor do the rank-order tournaments 
differ significantly from the Baseline condition.   
The results in Round 2 are similar to Round 1. In both rank-order tournaments, 
median Prediction Errors stay in the region of zero, as shown in Figure 13(b), while Average 
Prediction Errors (for the whole market and in each half) are generally not significantly 
different from zero (see Panel B of Table 9). The only exception to this is the GilCarrot 
treatment, in which according to the Average Prediction Error measure, asset Y sells at a 
statistically significant discount to asset X of around 4% in the first half of the median 
market, but only at the 10% level (one-sample Signed-rank test p-value = 0.075). In addition, 
while Average Prediction Error is higher in the second half of the market in the GilStick 
treatment compared to the first half, the statistical significance of the difference is only 
marginal (one-sided p-value = 0.058) and the economic significance even less so (3.46% in 
the first half vs. 3.85% in the second). Notably, relative prices in the GilCarrot treatment 
display none of the signs of heightened speculation in asset Y that is evident in the Carrot 
treatment in Round 2 (cf. Fig. 8). Furthermore, comparing the GilCarrot and GilStick 
treatments, we see in Panel B of Table 9 that differences in Average Prediction Error 
between the two treatments generally fail to attain statistical significance. The first half of the 
market again presents the exception; there is some evidence that the relative price of asset Y 
is higher in GilStick than in GilCarrot during this period, although significance here is only at 
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the 10% level (p-value = 0.093) and the difference is economically quite small (-4.14% in 
GilCarrot vs. 3.46% in GilStick).  
< Insert Figure 13 about here > 
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
 
5. Conclusion 
Tournament incentives have been accused in the experimental literature of distorting 
the efficient functioning of markets by exacerbating asset price bubbles. While this narrative 
tallies with mooted concerns regarding the link between market instability and the 
proliferation of convex incentive structures in the financial industry, the real-world relevance 
of these experimental results is limited by their examination of single-asset markets that 
preclude the ability to trade in securities with dissimilar risk characteristics, an option that is 
available to investors in real markets. Moreover, the reward-centric focus of existing studies 
means the role of penalties for poor performance in tournament contracts have been largely 
ignored, despite the fact that they may help to moderate risk-taking behaviour. We address 
these gaps in the literature by examining how rewards (‘carrots’) and penalties (‘sticks’) 
embedded in tournament contracts affect price behaviour in experimental asset markets 
where participants can trade in two differentiated assets. Each asset has the same risk-neutral 
fundamental value, but one asset is intrinsically riskier by virtue of a lottery-like dividend 
structure that generates potentially higher payoffs, thus allowing traders to naturally vary 
their risk by shifting in/out of the asset.  
Our results challenge the main conclusions of the existing literature. In two-asset 
experimental markets, we do not find any compelling evidence to suggest that asset price 
bubbles are larger under tournament incentives than normal, absolute-performance based 
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incentives. Moreover, unlike earlier studies, bubbles under tournament incentives in our 
markets do dissipate with experienced traders. Hence, the results of earlier studies appear to 
be driven by the single-asset nature of their markets.  
Furthermore, penalties embedded into tournament contracts that reward traders for 
‘beating the market’ reduce the volume of trading activity in inexperienced markets 
compared to reward-only contracts. However, the trade that does occur happens at higher 
prices, and periods of overvaluation last longer, especially in the case of the riskier asset. 
Thus, in markets with inexperienced traders, ‘sticks’ or penalties for underperformance are 
associated with greater mispricing, not less. While this may seem a counterintuitive and 
surprising result, it is consistent with price behaviour under tournament incentives when 
traders are prone to herd; the inclusion of a penalty for underperformance makes traders more 
likely to herd as a way to minimise the risk of being an underperformer, thus perversely 
exacerbating and prolonging mispricing. However, this effect does not appear to survive in 
our markets when participants are once-experienced. Moreover, we do not observe a 
significant difference in price behaviour between carrot-only and carrot-and-stick contracts 
when we implement a rank-order tournament, either with inexperienced or experienced 
traders.  
In light of the on-going debate surrounding compensation practices in the financial 
industry, our results are particularly relevant to policymakers and regulators. Our findings 
suggest that, at the aggregate-level, tournament incentives may not be as disruptive a force as 
earlier studies indicate. Furthermore, regulatory initiatives such as placing caps on finance 
professionals’ bonuses may be misplaced – shifting the balance between carrots and sticks 
further towards the stick-end may reduce (increase) the incentive to (herd) trade against the 
herd, thereby having the perverse effect of fuelling the instability that such actions seek to 
prevent. 
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Although we make important contributions towards better understanding the 
aggregate effects of tournament incentives, the laboratory environment in which we conduct 
our study is obviously considerably less complex than real markets and the real world. As 
such, our study is subject to the limitations of experimentation as a methodology. Foremost 
amongst these is the ‘penalty’ in our tournament contracts – a zero payment, which some may 
reasonably protest is not a ‘real’ penalty since it does not impose actual losses on traders. 
Whilst true, a zero payment represents the most an experimenter can penalise experiment 
participants, given that ethical considerations preclude experimenters from enforcing 
financial losses/liabilities on subjects. Even if it were possible, potential selection biases 
make it undesirable, since only certain types of subjects may volunteer for the experiment. 
Moreover, the gap between our non-penalty payment and the zero payment still represents a 
sizeable disincentive for university student participants, given the time commitment made. 
(2.5 hours). Hence, while the impact of ‘sticks’ may be diminished in an experimental setting 
compared to the real world – where professionals face the more sever risks of job termination 
and/or reputational damage – this suggests the differences that we do observe with 
inexperienced participants are likely to be underestimated. 
The fact that we consider markets with only two risky assets, whereas real-world 
markets are characterised by a myriad of potential investments, may be considered another 
limitation of our study. Furthermore, unlike our treatment groups, market participants in the 
real world do not all trade under the same incentives. These represent simplifications of the 
real world required to build a workable experimental design and isolate the effects of 
different incentive schemes. Thus the extents to which our results can be generalised when 
these restrictions are relaxed is an open question, and as such, represent potential avenues for 
future research. 
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Table 1: General Demographic Information 
This table reports general demographic information on the subject pool, categorised by the experimental 
treatment to which participants were randomly assigned. ‘Business student’ is defined as someone 
studying (self-reported) Finance, Economics, Actuarial, Accounting, or "Commerce". In a post-
experiment survey, all participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) developed by 
Frederick (2005), which measures cognitive ability; CRT scores are out of 3 and higher scores indicate 
better performance. Participants also completed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale 
(Blais and Weber 2006). The score reported here relates to participants’ (self-reported) likelihood of 
engaging in risky financial activities. Scores range from 6 to 42, with higher scores indicating a greater 
likelihood of engaging in risky activities. 
  Baseline Carrot Stick GilCarrot GilStick 
No. markets 7 8 8 6 6 
No. subjects 51 58 61 45 46 
Average age 22.3 22.4 22.2 22.7 22.6 
Male (%) 65 52 52 42 46 
Business students (%) 29 40 31 36 43 
Avg. CRT score 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 
Avg. DOSPERT Fin. score 19.2 19.4 18.5 19.8 18.8 
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Table 2: Summary of bubble measures for assets X and Y in Round 1 
This table reports median values of each bubble measure in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments during Round 1 of the market (i.e. with inexperienced traders); the 
associated median absolute deviations are displayed in parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. Panel A 
(B) reports bubble measure data relating to Asset X (Y). For definitions of the relevant bubble measures, refer to section 4.1.2. The statistical significance of the 
difference between treatments in each measure is assessed using a two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test, under the null that values from both treatments come 
from the same distribution. Exact p-values are reported. Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.   
Panel A: Asset X, Round 1:  
         
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
3.31 298.00 1.65 0.78 2.45 83.43 5.00 5.00 4.00 
(1.53) (181.50) (15.73) (0.16) (0.72) (45.08) (2.00) (2.00) (1.00) 
Carrot [8] 
1.51 569.50 -9.42 0.56 2.93 171.09 5.00 3.50 4.50 
(1.06) (330.25) (28.77) (0.36) (0.66) (104.79) (2.50) (2.00) (1.50) 
Stick [8] 
2.63 607.00 25.63 0.46 2.16 98.89 4.50 10.00 1.50 
(1.55) (267.75) (25.56) (0.35) (0.34) (47.69) (1.00) (1.50) (0.50) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs Carrot 0.867 0.779 0.536 0.536 0.281 0.397 0.799 0.317 0.290 
Baseline vs Stick 0.694 0.281 0.232 0.121 0.779 0.613 0.465 0.081* 0.400 
Carrot vs Stick 0.382 0.878 0.105 0.328 0.065* 0.878 0.576 0.007*** 0.039** 
Panel B: Asset Y, Round 1 
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
1.63 530.50 15.38 0.77 2.03 99.06 4.00 7.00 4.00 
(1.01) (150.50) (25.33) (0.05) (0.35) (54.11) (1.00) (1.00) (2.00) 
Carrot [8] 
1.76 584.75 -9.96 0.32 2.85 194.11 6.00 4.00 4.00 
(1.20) (299.50) (13.67) (0.27) (0.39) (71.02) (1.00) (2.00) (1.00) 
Stick [8] 
1.99 529.25 24.85 0.56 1.89 96.18 4.00 8.00 3.00 
(0.96) (270.00) (27.04) (0.30) (0.38) (39.99) (1.00) (2.50) (1.00) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs Carrot 0.955 0.955 0.232 0.463 0.281 0.694 0.421 0.013** 0.405 
Baseline vs Stick 0.779 0.955 0.336 0.613 0.613 0.867 1.000 0.755 0.669 
Carrot vs Stick 0.721 0.798 0.028** 0.721 0.038** 0.279 0.329 0.022** 0.124 
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Table 3: Average Prediction Errors 
Median values of the Average Prediction Error in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments in Round 1 
and 2 are shown below in Panels A and B respectively, with the associated median absolute deviations in 
parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. 
Average Prediction Error is calculated using all periods in a market, the first 6 periods, and the final 6 
periods in AvgPredErr, AvgPredErr_p1to6, and AvgPredErr_p7to12 respectively. The statistical 
significance of the individual measures is assessed using a (two-sided) one-sample Wilcoxon Signed-
rank test, under the null that the median is equal to zero. The statistical significance of the difference 
between treatments is assessed using the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test under the null that values 
from both treatments come from the same distribution. The statistical significance of the difference 
between AvgPredErr_p1to6 and AvgPredErr_p7to12 within each treatment is assessed using a (paired-
sample) Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, against the one-sided alternative hypothesis that 
AvgPredErr_p7to12 > AvgPredErr_p1to6. Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Round 1  
    
Treatment [N] 
Avg 
PredErr 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p1to6 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p7to12 
(%) 
Signed-
rank           
p-value  
(1-sided) 
 1-6 vs 7-12 
Baseline [7] 
3.78 -0.32 7.88 
0.064* 
(9.46) (3.36) (9.26) 
Carrot [8] 
3.17 -1.04 4.56 
0.242 
(4.43) (7.20) (8.01) 
Stick [8] 
3.23 0.14 4.03 
0.200 
(4.08) (6.85) (1.37) 
WMW U-Test p-values (2-sided): 
   Baseline vs Carrot 0.694 0.867 0.463 
 Baseline vs Stick 0.955 0.955 0.463 
 Carrot vs Stick 0.878 1.000 0.959 
 Panel B: Round 2        
Treatment [N] 
Avg 
PredErr 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p1to6 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p7to12 
(%) 
Signed-
rank           
p-value  
(1-sided) 
 1-6 vs 7-12 
Baseline [7] 
2.72 -0.12 5.23 
0.032** 
(11.33) (2.27) (21.08) 
Carrot [8] 
2.59 -12.70** 15.04* 
0.013** 
(14.92) (8.01) (24.94) 
Stick [8] 
-5.00 -3.68 -6.62 
0.556 
(8.41) (6.76) (7.08) 
WMW U-Test p-values (2-sided): 
   Baseline vs Carrot 1.000 0.189 0.779 
 Baseline vs Stick 0.397 0.281 0.397 
 Carrot vs Stick 0.279 0.505 0.105   
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Table 4: Summary of bubble measures for Assets X and Y in Round 2 
This table reports median values of each bubble measure in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments during Round 2 (i.e. with experienced traders); median absolute 
deviations are displayed in parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. Panel A (B) reports bubble measure 
data relating to Asset X (Y). For definitions of the relevant bubble measures, refer to section 4.1.2. The statistical significance of the difference between treatments in 
each measure is assessed using a two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test, under the null that values from both treatments come from the same distribution. Exact p-
values are reported. Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.   
Panel A: Asset X, Round 2 
         
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
1.15 323.50 10.96 0.82 1.60 39.45 3.00 8.00 3.00 
(0.79) (247.00) (13.55) (0.18) (0.69) (32.05) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
Carrot [8] 
0.80 302.00 2.94 0.85 2.04 64.30 4.00 5.50 3.00 
(0.35) (151.50) (11.25) (0.10) (1.00) (52.34) (2.00) (2.50) (2.00) 
Stick [8] 
1.97 689.00 40.17 0.77 1.66 101.15 5.00 8.00 3.00 
(1.59) (503.50) (47.38) (0.22) (0.45) (66.21) (1.50) (2.50) (1.50) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs Carrot 0.463 0.694 0.336 0.779 0.779 0.694 0.411 0.271 0.540 
Baseline vs Stick 0.955 0.867 1.000 0.779 0.536 0.955 0.797 1.000 0.717 
Carrot vs Stick 0.645 0.505 0.279 1.000 0.382 0.645 0.345 0.456 0.917 
Panel B: Asset Y, Round 2                   
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
2.16 626.00 24.33 0.52 1.50 127.50 5.00 7.00 3.00 
(0.72) (492.50) (68.88) (0.13) (0.47) (64.98) (3.00) (4.00) (2.00) 
Carrot [8] 
1.91 391.75 1.08 0.78 1.89 71.52 4.50 5.50 5.00 
(0.83) (56.25) (12.58) (0.12) (0.63) (48.75) (1.00) (1.50) (1.50) 
Stick [8] 
1.23 481.50 11.25 0.84 1.26 60.95 3.00 3.00 3.50 
(0.86) (216.75) (47.93) (0.13) (0.18) (40.14) (1.00) (3.00) (2.00) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs Carrot 0.867 0.121 0.094* 0.867 1.000 0.779 0.715 0.183 0.184 
Baseline vs Stick 0.613 0.281 0.536 0.613 0.463 0.281 0.282 0.035** 0.378 
Carrot vs Stick 0.574 0.505 0.721 0.574 0.487 0.798 0.209 0.197 0.530 
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Table 5: Comparing bubble measures between rounds 
This table reports the results of within-treatment comparisons of the bubble measures between market rounds in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments. 
Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. The values shown below are p-values from a two-sided Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that bubble measure values do not differ significantly between rounds 1 and 2. Differences that are significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively 
Panel A: Asset X, Round 1 vs Round 2: 
       
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation  
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 1.000 0.499 0.128 0.499 0.176 0.866 0.317 0.230 0.333 
Carrot [8] 0.575 0.327 0.575 0.674 0.012** 0.012** 0.160 0.323 0.256 
Stick [8] 0.674 0.674 0.779 0.036** 0.030** 0.093* 0.574 0.014** 0.078* 
          Panel B: Asset Y, Round 1 vs Round 2:               
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation  
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 0.735 0.091* 0.128 0.612 0.018** 0.866 0.475 0.932 0.795 
Carrot [8] 0.779 0.093* 0.779 0.401 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.477 0.725 
Stick [8] 0.208 0.401 0.161 0.124 0.036** 0.124 0.031** 0.011** 0.019** 
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Table 6: Summary of bubble measures in Round 1 using rank-order tournaments 
This table reports median values of each bubble measure in the Baseline, GilCarrot, and GilStick treatments during Round 1; median absolute deviations are displayed 
in parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. Panel A (B) reports bubble measure data relating to Asset X 
(Y). For definitions of the relevant bubble measures, refer to section 4.1.2. The statistical significance of the difference between treatments in each measure is assessed 
using a two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test, under the null that values from both treatments come from the same distribution. Exact p-values are reported. 
Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.   
Panel A: Asset X, Round 1:  
         
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation  
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
3.31 298.00 1.65 0.78 2.45 83.43 5.00 5.00 4.00 
(1.53) (181.50) (15.73) (0.16) (0.72) (45.08) (2.00) (2.00) (1.00) 
GilCarrot[6] 
3.05 758.50 23.42 0.46 3.91 262.55 5.00 8.00 3.50 
(1.71) (202.25) (19.52) (0.11) (0.85) (62.06) (2.50) (1.00) (1.00) 
GilStick [6] 
1.99 614.50 28.85 0.63 2.79 156.44 6.00 8.00 2.50 
(0.58) (222.00) (34.25) (0.08) (0.29) (64.60) (1.00) (2.00) (1.50) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs GilCarrot 0.945 0.366 0.836 0.051* 0.073* 0.073* 0.736 0.178 0.950 
Baseline vs GilStick 0.731 0.445 0.181 0.234 0.509 0.234 0.457 0.229 0.668 
GilCarrot vs GilStick 0.589 0.937 0.589 0.240 0.167 0.485 0.558 0.864 0.381 
Panel B: Asset Y, Round 1                   
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation  
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
1.63 530.50 15.38 0.77 2.03 99.06 4.00 7.00 4.00 
(1.01) (150.50) (25.33) (0.05) (0.35) (54.11) (1.00) (1.00) (2.00) 
GilCarrot[6] 
3.44 676.75 -5.05 0.35 2.79 169.82 4.00 5.00 3.50 
(1.99) (217.50) (31.55) (0.25) (0.44) (46.82) (2.00) (1.00) (1.50) 
GilStick [6] 
2.52 518.50 12.20 0.61 2.62 117.21 5.50 6.00 2.50 
(1.01) (103.25) (32.79) (0.10) (0.93) (53.74) (1.00) (3.50) (1.00) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs GilCarrot 0.731 0.836 0.366 0.731 0.445 0.534 0.871 0.508 0.530 
Baseline vs GilStick 0.731 1.000 0.836 0.945 0.731 0.731 0.508 0.458 0.751 
GilCarrot vs GilStick 0.818 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.937 0.937 0.675 0.894 0.374 
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Table 7: Summary of bubble measures in Round 2 using rank-order tournaments 
This table reports median values of each bubble measure in the Baseline, GilCarrot, and GilStick treatments during Round 2; median absolute deviations are displayed in 
parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded. Panel A (B) reports bubble measure data relating to Asset X (Y). 
For definitions of the relevant bubble measures, see section 4.1.2. The statistical significance of the difference between treatments in each measure is assessed using a 
two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test, under the null that values from both treatments come from the same distribution. Exact p-values are reported. Differences 
that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Asset X, Round 2:  
         
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
1.15 323.50 10.96 0.82 1.60 39.45 3.00 8.00 3.00 
(0.79) (247.00) (13.55) (0.18) (0.69) (32.05) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
GilCarrot[6] 
2.33 457.75 36.81 0.87 2.55 115.18 5.00 7.50 2.00 
(1.12) (119.75) (22.92) (0.02) (0.48) (45.08) (0.50) (2.50) (1.00) 
GilStick [6] 
0.92 446.25 25.54 0.85 2.59 81.13 3.50 6.00 3.00 
(0.49) (234.25) (30.01) (0.12) (0.86) (59.78) (1.00) (2.00) (0.50) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs Gil-Carrot 0.366 0.628 0.366 0.445 0.421 0.628 0.864 0.810 0.804 
Baseline vs Gil-Stick 0.731 0.836 0.945 0.731 0.219 0.945 0.493 0.650 0.935 
Gil-Carrot vs Gil-Stick 0.065* 0.485 0.485 0.818 0.784 0.394 0.210 0.303 0.498 
Panel B: Asset Y, Round 2                   
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
Baseline [7] 
2.16 626.00 24.33 0.52 1.50 127.50 5.00 7.00 3.00 
(0.72) (492.50) (68.88) (0.13) (0.47) (64.98) (3.00) (4.00) (2.00) 
GilCarrot[6] 
1.99 462.50 23.10 0.84 1.74 76.56 6.00 7.00 4.00 
(0.86) (143.25) (18.19) (0.02) (0.26) (28.16) (2.00) (2.00) (1.50) 
GilStick [6] 
1.75 694.25 52.35 0.57 2.25 96.66 2.50 7.00 1.50 
(0.60) (228.25) (18.20) (0.23) (0.94) (39.36) (1.00) (4.00) (0.50) 
WMW U-Test p-values (two-sided): 
        Baseline vs GilCarrot 0.945 0.295 0.628 0.181 0.628 0.628 0.386 0.833 0.705 
Baseline vs GilStick 0.628 0.534 0.731 1.000 0.313 0.836 0.422 0.756 0.755 
GilCarrot vs GilStick 0.818 0.589 0.310 0.240 0.589 0.589 0.106 0.985 0.284 
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Table 8: Comparing rank-order tournament bubble measures between rounds 
This table reports the results of within-treatment comparisons of bubble measures between market rounds in the GilCarrot and GilStick treatments. 
Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session are excluded.  Panel A (B) reports for asset X (Y). The values shown 
below are p-values from a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that bubble measure values do not differ significantly between 
rounds 1 and 2. Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively 
Panel A: Asset X, Round 1 vs Round 2: 
       
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
GilCarrot [6] 0.917 0.917 0.116 0.173 0.028** 0.463 0.674 0.916 0.190 
GilStick [6] 0.028** 0.046** 0.249 0.173 0.463 0.075* 0.091* 0.058* 0.593 
          Panel B: Asset Y, Round 1 vs Round 2:               
Treatment [N] Amplitude     
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turnover 
Normalised 
Deviation 
Duration 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
GilCarrot [6] 0.917 0.917 0.463 0.116 0.028** 0.173 0.461 0.597 0.665 
GilStick [6] 0.075* 0.600 0.173 0.917 0.046** 0.249 0.058* 0.525 0.597 
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Table 9: Average Prediction Errors – Rank-order tournaments 
Median values of the Average Prediction Error in the Baseline, Carrot, and Stick treatments in Round 
1 and 2 are shown below in Panels A and B respectively, with the associated median absolute 
deviations in parentheses. Markets contaminated by subjects who had participated in an earlier session 
are excluded. Average Prediction Error is calculated using all periods in a market, the first 6 periods, 
and the final 6 periods in Avg PredErr, AvgPredErr_p1to6, and AvgPredErr_p7to12 respectively. The 
statistical significance of the individual measures is assessed using a (two-sided) one-sample Wilcoxon 
Signed-rank test, under the null that the median is equal to zero. The statistical significance of the 
difference between treatments is assessed using the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U Test under the null 
that values from both treatments come from the same distribution. The statistical significance of the 
difference between AvgPredErr_p1to6 and AvgPredErr_p7to12 within each treatment is assessed 
using a (paired-sample) Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, against the one-sided alternative hypothesis that 
AvgPredErr_p7to12 > AvgPredErr_p1to6. Differences that are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Round 1  
    
Treatment [N] 
Avg 
PredErr 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p1to6 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p7to12 
(%) 
Signed-
rank           
p-value  
(1-sided) 
 1-6 vs 7-12 
Baseline [7] 
3.78 -0.32 7.88 
0.064* 
(9.46) (3.36) (9.26) 
GilCarrot [6] 
-3.22 -3.21 -3.09 
0.377 
(8.79) (2.78) (15.48) 
GilStick [6] 
2.05 -0.92 6.00 
0.377 
(7.17) (4.64) (9.49) 
WMW U-Test p-values (2-sided): 
   Baseline vs Gil-Carrot 0.295 0.836 0.295 
 Baseline vs Gil-Stick 0.295 0.945 0.534 
 Gil-Carrot vs Gil-Stick 0.937 0.699 0.937 
 Panel B: Round 2        
Treatment [N] 
Avg 
PredErr 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p1to6 
(%) 
AvgPredErr
_p7to12 
(%) 
Signed-
rank           
p-value  
(1-sided) 
 1-6 vs 7-12 
Baseline [7] 
2.72 -0.12 5.23 
0.032** 
(11.33) (2.27) (21.08) 
GilCarrot [6] 
-4.51 -4.14* -3.63 
0.377 
(4.95) (4.27) (6.68) 
GilStick [6] 
3.80 3.46 3.85 
0.058* 
(9.64) (4.29) (8.95) 
WMW U-Test p-values (2-sided): 
   Baseline vs Gil-Carrot 0.295 0.181 0.366 
 Baseline vs Gil-Stick 0.836 0.836 1.000 
 Gil-Carrot vs Gil-Stick 0.180 0.093* 0.180   
 60 
Figure 1: Trading Interface 
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Figure 2: Fundamental value process, assets X and Y 
The solid black line in the graph below depicts the risk-neutral fundamental value 
process of assets X and Y. Both assets pay an expected dividend of 20 per period. 
The dashed and solid grey (blue) lines depict the largest and smallest possible 
cumulative future dividend realisations of asset X (Y) respectively. Asset X pays a 
minimum of 10 francs in dividends each period, and a maximum of 30 per period. 
Asset Y pays a minimum of zero every period and a maximum of 100 every period. 
Hence, the blue dotted line, which is only partially graphed, starts at 1200 in period 
1 and falls in steps of 100 in each ensuing period. 
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Figure 3: Median prices in Round 1 
Median transaction prices in the Baseline (solid blue line), Carrot (dashed purple line), and Stick (dotted 
red line) treatments during the first round of the market (i.e. with inexperienced traders) are shown below 
for the ‘low-risk’ asset X (panel (a)) and ‘high-risk’ asset Y (panel (b)), along with the risk-neutral 
fundamental value process for each asset (dashed black line). For each treatment, the plotted median price 
in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets belonging to that treatment. 
Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an earlier 
session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 4: Median value of Prediction Error, Round 1 
The figure below plots the evolution of the median Prediction Error in the Baseline 
(solid blue line), Carrot (dashed purple line), and Stick (dotted red line) treatments 
during the first round of the market (i.e. with inexperienced traders). For each treatment, 
the plotted value in each period is the median of the Prediction Errors from all markets 
in that treatment. Prediction Error is defined as the percentage difference between the 
relative price of Y (i.e. median price of asset Y divided by median price of asset X) and 
the risk-neutral benchmark of 1. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence 
of subjects who had participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 5: Median prices in Round 2 
Median transaction prices in the Baseline (solid blue line), Carrot (dashed purple line), and Stick (dotted 
red line) treatments during the second round of the market (i.e. with experienced traders) are shown 
below for the ‘low-risk’ asset X (panel (a)) and ‘high-risk’ asset Y (panel (b)), along with the risk-
neutral fundamental value process for each asset (black dotted line). For each treatment, the plotted 
median price in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets belonging 
to that treatment. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had 
participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 6: Median prices for asset X, Round 1 vs. Round 2 
This figure compares the median-price behaviour of the ‘low-risk’ asset X between the two rounds of the market in the Baseline (panel (a)), Carrot (panel (b), and 
Stick (panel (c)) treatment. The red dashed line depicts Round 1 prices; the blue dashed line depicts Round 2 prices, while the black dotted line is the fundamental 
value process. The plotted median price in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets in that treatment. Any markets that were 
‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 7: Median prices for asset Y, Round 1 vs. Round 2 
This figure compares the median-price behaviour of the ‘high-risk’ asset Y between the two rounds of the market in the Baseline (panel (a)), Carrot (panel (b), and 
Stick (panel (c)) treatment. The red dashed line depicts Round 1 prices; the blue dashed line depicts Round 2 prices, while the black dotted line is the fundamental 
value process. The plotted median price in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets in that treatment. Any markets that were 
‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 8: Median value of Prediction Error, Round 2 
The figure below plots the evolution of the median Prediction Error in the 
Baseline (solid blue line), Carrot (dashed purple line), and Stick (dashed red line) 
treatment during the second round of the market (i.e. with experienced traders). 
For each treatment, the plotted value in each period is the median of the Prediction 
Errors from all markets in that treatment. Prediction Error is defined as the 
percentage difference between the relative price of Y (i.e. median price of asset Y 
divided by median price of asset X) and the risk-neutral benchmark of 1. Any 
markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated 
in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 9: Median prices in J&I tournament vs. Gilpatric tournament, Asset X 
The median-price behaviour of the ‘low-risk’ asset X in Round 1 (i.e. inexperienced traders) is 
compared between James and Isaac (200)-based tournament treatments and the corresponding 
Gilpatric (2009)-based rank-order tournament treatment below. Panel (a) depicts median prices in 
the Carrot treatment (purple dashed line) and the GilCarrot treatment (yellow dotted line), while 
Panel (b) shows medians prices in the Stick treatment (red dashed line) and the GilStick (blue 
dotted line) treatment. Also shown is the risk-neutral fundamental process (black dashed line). For 
each treatment, the plotted median price in each period is the median of the median transaction 
prices from all markets belonging to that treatment. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the 
presence of subjects who had participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
Figure 10: Median prices in J&I tournament vs. Gilpatric tournament, Asset Y 
The median-price behaviour of the ‘high-risk’ asset Y in Round 1 (i.e. inexperienced traders) is 
compared between James and Isaac (200)-based tournament treatments and the corresponding Gilpatric 
(2009)-based rank-order tournament treatment below. Panel (a) depicts median prices in the Carrot 
treatment (purple dashed line) and the GilCarrot treatment (yellow dotted line), while Panel (b) shows 
medians prices in the Stick treatment (red dashed line) and the GilStick (blue dotted line) treatment. 
Also shown is the risk-neutral fundamental process (black dashed line). For each treatment, the plotted 
median price in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets belonging 
to that treatment. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had 
participated in an earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 11: Median prices in rank-order tournaments, Round 1 
Median transaction prices in the Baseline (solid blue line), GilCarrot (dashed yellow line), and GilStick 
(blue dotted line) treatments during the first round of the market (i.e. with inexperienced traders) are 
shown below for the ‘low-risk’ asset X (panel (a)) and ‘high-risk’ asset Y (panel (b)), along with the 
risk-neutral fundamental value process (dashed black line). For each treatment, the plotted median price 
in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets belonging to that 
treatment. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an 
earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 12: Median prices in rank-order tournaments, Round 2 
Median transaction prices in the Baseline (solid blue line), GilCarrot (dashed yellow line), and GilStick 
(blue dotted line) treatments during the second round of the market (i.e. with experienced traders) are 
shown below for the ‘low-risk’ asset X (panel (a)) and ‘high-risk’ asset Y (panel (b)), along with the 
risk-neutral fundamental value process (dashed black line). For each treatment, the plotted median price 
in each period is the median of the median transaction prices from all markets belonging to that 
treatment. Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an 
earlier session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Figure 13: Median value of Prediction Error, rank-order tournaments 
The evolution of the median Prediction Error in the GilCarrot (dashed yellow line), and GilStick (dashed 
blue line) treatment is shown below for Round 1 of the market in panel (a) and Round 2 in panel (b). For 
each treatment, the plotted value in each period is the median of the Prediction Errors from all markets in 
that treatment. Prediction Error is defined as the percentage difference between the relative price of Y 
(i.e. median price of asset Y divided by median price of asset X) and the risk-neutral benchmark of 1. 
Any markets that were ‘contaminated’ by the presence of subjects who had participated in an earlier 
session of the experiment are excluded. 
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
  
Tables A1-A4 below display the individual bubble measure values from each market of 
each treatment. Table A1 (A2) reports for asset X (Y) in Round 1 of the market. Table 
A3 (A4) reports for asset X (Y) in Round 2. The relevant bubble measures are defined in 
section 4.1.2. 
 
Table A1: Bubble measures for asset X in Round 1 
Panel A: Baseline 
        
 
Market Amp.     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
B
as
el
in
e 
 
B1 3.36 797.50 66.46 0.78 1.91 128.51 5 12 0 
B2 1.79 291.50 17.38 0.94 2.45 53.45 5 5 1 
B3 3.31 298.00 -7.83 0.56 1.53 43.43 4 4 5 
B4 3.42 553.00 -3.92 0.47 3.33 167.78 11 7 5 
B6 0.82 286.50 -15.54 0.81 2.93 83.43 3 5 4 
B7 7.30 947.00 18.58 0.68 3.17 263.97 11 7 5 
B8 0.40 116.50 1.65 0.94 1.26 17.40 3 2 2 
Median: 3.31 298.00 1.65 0.78 2.45 83.43 5.00 5.00 4.00 
          
Panel B: Carrot         
 
Market Amp     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
C
ar
ro
t 
C1 0.41 115.50 -6.71 0.89 2.93 41.53 3 1 3 
C2 4.82 1527.50 99.29 0.09 4.00 331.88 6 5 4 
C3 1.50 868.50 -67.54 0.15 3.80 265.09 10 2 9 
C4 9.02 997.50 42.29 0.20 2.94 267.43 3 8 1 
C6 1.53 593.50 -12.13 0.23 4.40 238.53 9 5 5 
C7 5.13 545.50 26.29 0.92 2.49 103.66 11 9 3 
C8 0.55 228.50 -16.54 0.96 2.69 57.86 4 2 6 
C9 0.50 250.00 -31.25 0.91 0.63 20.67 2 0 7 
Median: 1.51 569.50 -9.42 0.56 2.93 171.09 5.00 3.50 4.50 
           Panel C: Stick         
 
Market Amp     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
S
ti
ck
 
S1 9.58 1435.00 119.58 0.02 3.74 458.57 10 12 0 
S2 7.89 961.00 58.58 0.01 1.88 154.08 5 10 1 
S3 2.19 474.50 0.88 0.66 2.38 112.43 3 8 4 
S4 4.33 527.00 35.58 0.65 2.13 85.35 3 11 1 
S5 0.57 198.00 -0.75 0.91 1.78 23.73 5 3 6 
S6 2.97 875.50 55.46 0.27 1.28 78.68 4 11 1 
S7 1.22 340.00 15.67 0.81 2.20 58.69 5 8 2 
S8 2.28 687.00 2.75 0.12 2.86 184.57 2 10 2 
Median: 2.63 607.00 25.63 0.46 2.16 98.89 4.50 10.00 1.50 
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Table A1 cont. 
         Panel D: GilCarrot                  
 
Market Amp     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
C
ar
ro
t 
GC1 3.30 913.00 32.75 0.08 3.83 284.38 7 9 3 
GC2 2.81 747.00 43.92 0.39 4.95 349.18 2 10 2 
GC3 4.47 770.00 -31.50 0.33 4.58 300.05 11 4 8 
GC4 0.63 229.00 14.08 0.91 4.00 54.13 2 7 4 
GC5 1.04 353.50 -8.29 0.55 1.63 101.17 6 8 2 
GC6 10.45 1008.50 41.96 0.52 2.87 240.73 4 8 4 
Median: 3.05 758.50 23.42 0.46 3.91 262.55 5.00 8.00 3.50 
           Panel E: GilStick                  
 
Market Amp     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
S
ti
ck
 
GS1 1.49 682.50 -12.46 0.09 2.75 225.20 6 6 4 
GS2 2.65 899.00 73.25 0.60 2.43 201.89 7 11 1 
GS3 0.79 280.00 1.67 0.74 2.83 67.68 5 5 3 
GS4 1.62 455.00 24.58 0.75 3.00 96.00 4 9 1 
GS5 9.71 1606.00 85.33 0.57 3.85 302.95 9 7 5 
GS7 2.37 546.50 33.13 0.67 2.43 111.00 6 10 2 
 Median: 1.99 614.50 28.85 0.63 2.79 156.44 6.00 8.00 2.50 
Note: Market B5 in the Baseline treatment, C5 in the Carrot treatment, and GS6 in the GilStick treatment are 
excluded because they contain subjects who participated in an earlier session of the experiment.   
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Table A2: Bubble measures for asset Y in Round 1 
Panel A: Baseline 
        
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
Haessel 
R
2
 
Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
B
as
el
in
e 
 
B1 1.63 681.00 53.58 0.78 2.06 99.06 4 10 1 
B2 2.66 514.50 46.77 0.82 1.75 77.20 3 7 0 
B3 0.62 310.50 -16.88 0.77 1.55 44.95 4 3 6 
B4 4.25 629.50 0.29 0.05 4.68 240.83 6 7 5 
B6 1.12 530.50 -9.96 0.53 2.03 109.70 2 8 4 
B7 7.35 1089.00 22.42 0.54 3.29 316.63 11 7 4 
B8 0.81 289.50 15.38 0.81 1.69 38.23 5 9 2 
Median: 1.63 530.50 15.38 0.77 2.03 99.06 4.00 7.00 4.00 
           Panel B: Carrot                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
C
ar
ro
t 
C1 0.47 168.50 -9.38 0.88 2.80 60.85 3 2 3 
C2 4.60 1570.50 98.96 0.05 2.85 265.10 6 7 2 
C3 1.61 886.00 -66.42 0.12 3.60 265.17 10 3 9 
C4 4.61 882.50 -10.54 0.05 2.66 224.34 6 5 3 
C6 1.27 559.50 -5.96 0.32 4.45 241.93 5 7 4 
C7 4.54 610.00 18.33 0.33 2.86 163.89 7 6 4 
C8 0.66 200.00 -14.50 0.86 3.43 60.57 7 2 6 
C9 1.92 469.00 -32.75 0.66 0.87 28.57 2 2 5 
Median: 1.76 584.75 -9.96 0.32 2.85 194.11 6.00 4.00 4.00 
           Panel C: Stick                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
S
ti
ck
 
S1 5.74 1582.00 131.83 0.10 1.74 209.09 6 12 0 
S2 7.49 1121.00 58.58 0.02 1.98 211.43 5 9 3 
S3 1.66 473.50 -4.88 0.74 2.98 132.93 4 6 6 
S4 1.05 363.50 10.96 0.70 2.40 85.05 3 8 3 
S5 0.93 228.50 4.46 0.88 1.00 16.63 4 3 3 
S6 2.66 996.50 62.21 0.25 1.33 107.30 8 11 1 
S7 1.00 290.00 0.50 0.85 2.14 52.94 3 8 4 
S8 2.32 585.00 38.75 0.43 1.80 75.86 4 5 2 
Median: 1.99 529.25 24.85 0.56 1.89 96.18 4.00 8.00 3.00 
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Table A2 cont.          
Panel D: GilCarrot                 
 
Market Amp.     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
C
ar
ro
t 
GC1 2.91 1000.50 44.13 0.06 2.65 216.85 9 9 3 
GC2 3.96 704.00 48.67 0.49 3.93 216.43 2 10 2 
GC3 4.68 788.00 -33.17 0.14 2.93 163.28 11 4 8 
GC4 0.71 194.50 9.54 0.92 3.18 51.63 2 6 4 
GC5 0.43 274.50 -19.65 0.93 1.63 101.57 3 4 2 
GC6 21.86 649.50 -40.04 0.21 2.30 176.37 5 4 7 
Median: 3.44 676.75 -5.05 0.35 2.79 169.82 4.00 5.00 3.50 
           Panel E: GilStick                 
 
Market Amp.     
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
S
ti
ck
 
GS1 1.34 631.00 -29.17 0.07 3.58 235.20 8 5 3 
GS2 3.02 889.50 79.05 0.60 1.71 116.97 4 7 1 
GS3 1.00 322.00 -4.30 0.63 1.45 41.33 5 2 3 
GS4 3.36 424.50 28.71 0.82 2.75 85.63 6 10 1 
GS5 4.24 520.00 -31.33 0.59 4.38 220.95 6 2 10 
GS7 2.03 517.00 36.42 0.78 2.49 117.46 3 9 2 
Median: 2.52 518.50 12.20 0.61 2.62 117.21 5.50 6.00 2.50 
Note: Market B5 in the Baseline treatment, C5 in the Carrot treatment, and GS6 in the GilStick treatment are 
excluded because they contain subjects who participated in an earlier session of the experiment.   
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Table A3: Bubble measures for asset X in Round 2 
Panel A: Baseline 
        
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
B
as
el
in
e 
 
B1 4.76 1324.00 120.36 0.02 2.29 261.09 7 11 0 
B2 0.53 279.50 19.63 0.93 1.50 31.80 3 8 2 
B3 0.62 221.00 -13.42 0.82 1.60 39.45 2 2 4 
B4 2.03 571.50 10.96 0.46 3.05 156.18 9 8 4 
B6 1.15 323.50 1.38 0.82 1.43 39.03 3 7 3 
B7 92.26 3083.00 234.75 0.32 3.00 510.40 11 9 3 
B8 0.35 76.50 -2.59 0.99 0.89 7.40 3 3 3 
 
Median: 1.15 323.50 10.96 0.82 1.60 39.45 3.00 8.00 3.00 
           Panel B: Carrot                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
C
ar
ro
t 
C1 0.48 124.00 -10.36 0.92 0.75 10.60 2 1 6 
C2 0.83 265.00 6.25 0.93 3.65 71.55 2 4 5 
C3 1.95 829.50 -0.38 0.08 2.74 200.63 3 8 3 
C4 11.63 1346.50 110.54 0.05 2.00 228.09 5 9 1 
C6 0.76 339.00 -12.75 0.78 3.40 115.28 6 7 5 
C7 0.41 168.50 12.14 0.94 1.83 28.23 5 3 1 
C8 1.05 396.00 8.42 0.67 2.09 57.06 7 7 3 
C9 0.35 132.50 -16.19 0.98 0.47 6.70 2 1 3 
 
Median: 0.80 302.00 2.94 0.85 2.04 64.30 4.00 5.50 3.00 
           Panel C: Stick                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
S
ti
ck
 
S1 3.35 1742.00 139.67 0.48 2.40 288.69 6 10 2 
S2 8.07 989.50 67.46 0.03 1.88 161.28 11 9 3 
S3 0.54 480.00 -40.00 0.87 1.55 77.33 5 0 12 
S4 7.21 1865.50 169.59 0.67 1.18 124.98 8 11 0 
S5 0.21 96.00 -8.00 0.99 0.78 7.65 2 0 5 
S6 0.56 248.00 18.83 0.95 1.78 28.85 5 7 3 
S7 0.59 123.00 -6.42 0.98 1.26 16.43 3 4 5 
S8 9.38 898.00 61.50 0.06 2.17 161.20 4 9 2 
 
Median: 1.97 689.00 40.17 0.77 1.66 101.15 5.00 8.00 3.00 
                      
           
           
           
           
           
 78 
Table A3 cont.          
Panel D: GilCarrot                 
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
C
ar
ro
t 
GC1 1.34 416.00 13.83 0.90 2.80 103.05 3 7 5 
GC2 1.08 434.50 34.38 0.86 3.00 109.70 5 8 2 
GC3 18.34 1629.50 59.68 0.86 2.30 366.90 5 5 5 
GC4 3.29 481.00 39.25 0.87 3.05 120.65 6 11 1 
GC5 1.37 260.00 11.50 0.94 1.43 37.14 4 10 2 
GC6 5.12 1065.00 98.50 0.08 2.03 217.00 5 5 1 
 
Median: 2.33 457.75 36.81 0.87 2.55 115.18 5.00 7.50 2.00 
           Panel E: GilStick                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
S
ti
ck
 
GS1 0.67 370.50 -22.46 0.78 3.90 107.00 7 4 6 
GS2 1.05 522.00 38.83 0.91 1.31 55.26 3 9 3 
GS3 0.18 57.00 -5.18 0.99 1.75 13.40 2 0 3 
GS4 0.78 199.00 12.25 0.95 1.75 29.30 4 8 2 
GS5 2.44 912.00 54.83 0.31 3.48 241.40 4 8 3 
GS7 1.95 667.50 64.55 0.67 3.43 165.80 2 4 1 
  Median: 0.92 446.25 25.54 0.85 2.59 81.13 3.50 6.00 3.00 
Note: Market B5 in the Baseline treatment, C5 in the Carrot treatment, and GS6 in the GilStick treatment are 
excluded because they contain subjects who participated in an earlier session of the experiment.   
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Table A4: Bubble measures for asset Y in Round 2 
Panel A: Baseline 
        
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
B
as
el
in
e 
 
B1 2.70 1118.50 93.21 0.58 1.97 150.60 5 12 0 
B2 2.16 1310.00 109.17 0.68 1.50 127.50 3 12 0 
B3 0.80 572.50 -46.46 0.46 1.23 62.53 5 1 7 
B4 2.87 560.00 11.83 0.52 2.63 148.53 8 7 5 
B6 1.54 626.00 24.33 0.39 0.97 47.87 2 7 2 
B7 104.24 3689.00 286.75 0.40 3.09 416.91 11 9 3 
B8 0.51 113.00 0.40 0.97 1.03 11.31 1 3 5 
Median: 2.16 626.00 24.33 0.52 1.50 127.50 5.00 7.00 3.00 
           Panel B: Carrot                  
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
C
ar
ro
t 
C1 0.43 271.50 -23.77 0.86 1.00 23.38 2 1 7 
C2 0.80 364.50 5.46 0.85 2.25 73.88 3 2 9 
C3 2.10 766.00 -14.42 0.01 2.00 169.54 5 7 4 
C4 8.56 667.00 21.25 0.04 2.03 140.66 5 7 5 
C6 2.26 422.50 -3.29 0.37 3.93 162.88 5 7 5 
C7 3.30 379.00 10.75 0.94 1.77 69.17 6 7 3 
C8 1.35 404.50 -15.05 0.79 1.00 45.40 4 4 5 
C9 1.71 310.00 6.25 0.78 0.50 22.17 1 2 3 
Median: 1.91 391.75 1.08 0.78 1.89 71.52 4.50 5.50 5.00 
           Panel C: Stick                   
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
S
ti
ck
 
S1 3.42 1565.00 134.73 0.42 1.94 248.77 2 6 2 
S2 4.51 841.00 71.00 0.16 1.40 109.18 4 7 3 
S3 0.59 453.50 -41.23 0.92 1.48 81.65 3 0 7 
S4 1.29 509.50 -41.77 0.76 1.13 38.60 2 2 8 
S5 0.37 34.50 -3.14 1.00 1.10 6.50 2 0 4 
S6 1.16 322.00 25.64 0.93 1.08 28.90 4 6 1 
S7 0.36 353.50 -32.14 0.91 1.09 40.26 4 0 9 
S8 8.23 755.50 48.55 0.01 1.46 109.77 3 4 3 
Median: 1.23 481.50 11.25 0.84 1.26 60.95 3.00 3.00 3.50 
                      
           
           
           
           
           
 80 
Table A4 cont.          
Panel D: GilCarrot                 
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
C
ar
ro
t 
GC1 1.03 277.00 -3.00 0.92 1.53 33.40 2 5 4 
GC2 1.51 448.50 33.38 0.84 2.23 76.55 6 10 2 
GC3 16.01 1654.50 57.96 0.86 1.75 260.08 10 6 5 
GC4 5.21 476.50 31.38 0.84 2.50 94.15 5 9 1 
GC5 2.46 302.00 14.83 0.81 1.43 37.83 6 8 4 
GC6 1.23 588.50 -34.21 0.39 1.73 76.57 9 3 7 
Median: 1.99 462.50 23.10 0.84 1.74 76.56 6.00 7.00 4.00 
           Panel E: GilStick                 
 
Market Amp. 
Tot. 
Disp. 
Avg. 
Bias 
H-R
2
 Turn. 
Norm. 
Dev 
Dur. 
Boom 
Dur 
Bust 
Dur 
G
il
S
ti
ck
 
GS1 1.55 429.00 -31.17 0.49 3.10 145.65 5 3 7 
GS2 1.36 793.50 65.71 0.83 1.14 83.74 2 11 1 
GS3 0.32 60.00 -0.82 0.98 1.23 6.75 1 2 1 
GS4 2.76 595.00 53.40 0.37 1.85 66.93 3 6 2 
GS5 2.56 920.50 51.29 0.22 3.88 288.18 7 8 3 
GS7 1.96 924.50 75.38 0.65 2.66 109.57 2 11 1 
Median: 1.75 694.25 52.35 0.57 2.25 96.66 2.50 7.00 1.50 
Note: Market B5 in the Baseline treatment, C5 in the Carrot treatment, and GS6 in the GilStick treatment are 
excluded because they contain subjects who participated in an earlier session of the experiment.   
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Appendix B: Participant instructions 
 
The written instructions provided to participants are shown below (next page). These 
instructions relate to sessions where the market screen for asset X was displayed on the 
left-hand side of the screen – the instructions for sessions where Y was displayed on the 
left are qualitatively the same. Treatments vary according to how earnings are 
calculated, which is addressed in section 6 of the instructions – this section was unique 
to each treatment. Treatments also vary according the amount of relative performance 
feedback given, which is covered in Section 5. 
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1. General Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are 
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a 
considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment. The experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in which you 
will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. All trading will be in terms of 
francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in Australian 
dollars, rounded up to the nearest 5 dollars. The conversion rate is ____ francs to 1 
dollar. 
The experiment will last no more than 2.5 hours, and will include up to 30 minutes of 
instructions and practice. Please do not speak with any other participants during the 
experiment. Please also remember to switch off your mobile phone. Failure to comply 
with these rules will result in your exclusion from the experiment and the forfeiture of all 
payments. 
 
2. How to Use the Computerised Market 
Before proceeding, we introduce the market interface that you will be using for the 
remainder of the experiment. Please note that any actions you take during this 
demonstration will not count towards your earnings or influence your position later in the 
experiment. 
In this experiment, you will have the opportunity to buy and sell two different goods, 
called X and Y, in separate markets. In each trading period, you will see a computer 
screen like the one shown below: 
 
 
 
 
Time (in seconds) 
remaining in the 
current trading 
period 
Your holdings of 
cash and goods 
is displayed here. 
Market for Good X Market for Good Y 
Current Trading 
Period is displayed 
here 
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Market: Good X 
The market for good X is displayed on the left-hand side of your screen. All activity in 
relation to good X is shown and conducted here.  
When you would like to offer to sell a unit of X, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to 
sell one unit of X” in the first column on the left. In that text area you can enter the price 
at which you are offering to sell a unit of X, and then select “Submit Offer To Sell X”. 
Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and then click on the button 
labelled “Submit Offer To Sell X”.  
You will notice that 8 numbers, one submitted by each participant in your market, now 
appear in the second column from the left, entitled “Offers to Sell X”. Your offer is listed 
in blue. Submitting a new offer will replace your previous offer. 
The lowest offer-to-sell price will always be on the top of that list and will, by default, be 
selected. You can select a different offer by clicking on it. It will then be highlighted. If 
you select “Buy X”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one unit of X 
for the currently selected sell price. Please purchase a unit now by selecting an offer and 
clicking the “Buy” button. Since each of you had offered to sell a unit of X and attempted 
to buy a unit of X, if all were successful, you all have the same number of units of X you 
started out with. This is because you bought one unit of X and sold one unit of X. 
You may make an offer to buy a unit of X by selecting “Submit Offer to Buy X.” Please 
do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy one unit of X”, then press 
the button labelled “Submit Offer To Buy X”. All offers to buy X appear under the 
column entitled “Offers to Buy X”. The highest offer-to-buy price will always be on top 
of that list and will, by default, be selected. You can accept any of the offers-to-buy by 
selecting the offer and then clicking on the “Sell X” button. Please do so now. 
The middle column of the market, labelled “Transaction Prices: X”, shows the prices at 
which X has been bought and sold in this period. The most recent transaction will be 
listed at the top. 
 
Market: Good Y 
The market for good Y is displayed on the right-hand side of your screen. All activity in 
relation to good Y is shown and conducted here. The layout of this market is identical to 
the market for X. The trading rules and procedures for posting and accepting offers to 
buy and sell Y are also the same. 
To post an offer to sell a unit of Y, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell one unit 
of Y” and then select “Submit Offer To Sell Y”. Please do so now. 
You can purchase a unit of Y by clicking the button “Buy Y” at the bottom of the column 
called “Offers to Sell Y”. Once again, the lowest offer-to-sell price is listed at the top and 
is selected by default. You can accept any offer by selecting it before clicking “Buy Y”. 
Please purchase a unit of Y now. 
To make an offer to buy a unit of Y, type a number into the text area entitled “Enter offer 
to buy one unit of Y” and then select “Submit Offer To Buy Y”. Please do so now.  
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These offers are listed in the column “Offers to Buy Y”. To accept an offer, click “Sell 
Y” at the bottom of this column. The highest offer-to-buy price is selected by default. 
You can accept any of the offers by selecting it before clicking “Sell Y”. Please do so 
now.  
The middle column of the market, labelled “Transaction Prices: Y”, shows the prices at 
which Y has been bought and sold in this period. The most recent transaction will be 
listed at the top. 
 
Other features of both markets:               
When you buy a unit of a good (i.e. X or Y), your Cash balance decreases by the price of 
the purchase. Any other existing offer to buy that good submitted by you is also 
cancelled. When you sell a unit of a good, your Cash balance increases by the price of the 
sale, and any other existing offer to sell that good submitted by you is cancelled. 
You can participate in both markets at the same time.  
If you make offers to buy in both markets at the same time, and say your offer to buy X is 
accepted first, then your offer to buy Y remains standing as long as you have enough 
Cash after the purchase of X to honour it, and vice versa. If you do not have enough 
Cash, then your offer in the second market is cancelled. Similarly, if you have a standing 
offer to buy in one market, and accept another trader’s sell offer in the second market, 
then your offer to buy in the first market is cancelled if your remaining Cash balance is 
less than the amount of your offer.    
You will now have about 10 minutes to buy and sell in both markets. This is a practice 
period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and 
do not influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice 
period is to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully 
submitted offers to buy and offers to sell in both markets. Also be sure that you have 
accepted buy and sell offers in both markets. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand and the experimenter will come by and assist you. 
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3. Specific Instructions for this Experiment 
This experiment consists of you and 7 other traders. At the beginning of the experiment, 
all traders will be endowed with a portfolio consisting of 5 units each of two types of 
goods, called ‘X’ and ‘Y’, and 1950 francs in Cash. 
The experiment consists of 12 periods, each lasting 3 minutes. In each period, two 
separate markets will operate in which you may buy and/or sell units of good X and Y 
respectively. Both goods can be considered assets with lives of 12 periods, and your 
inventory of X and Y carries over from one trading period to the next. Note that your 
cash balance and inventory of assets cannot fall below zero. 
At the end of each trading period, each unit of X pays an identical dividend, which is 
randomly determined by the computer. The possible dividend values and the associated 
likelihoods are shown below:  
Asset: X 
Dividend  Likelihood 
10  1 2⁄  
30  1 2⁄  
 
Since each dividend is equally likely, the average dividend per period for X is 20 francs. 
Each unit of Y also pays an identical dividend at the end of each period, randomly 
determined by the computer. The possible dividend values and the associated likelihoods 
are shown below:  
 Asset: Y 
Dividend  Likelihood 
0  4 5⁄   
100  1 5⁄  
 
The average dividend per period for asset Y is 20 francs (0 × 4 5⁄ + 100 × 1 5⁄ = 20).  
The dividend draws for X and Y are independent across trading periods. This means that 
for both assets, the likelihood of a particular dividend in a period is not affected by the 
dividends in previous periods. In addition, the dividend draws for X and Y are 
independent of each other. This means that the occurrence of a particular dividend for X 
does not affect the likelihood of a particular dividend for Y, and vice versa. 
Each unit of X and Y expires worthless after the final dividend is paid at the end of 
period 12.  
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4. Average Holding Value Table 
You can use the table at the end of this document to help you make decisions. It 
calculates the average amount of dividends you will receive if you hold a unit of an asset 
in your inventory for the rest of the market, or equivalently, how much in dividends you 
give up, on average, when you sell a unit at any time. Each of the 5 columns of the table 
is described below: 
1. Ending Period: indicates the last trading period of the market, period 12.  
2. Current Period: indicates the period during which the average holding value is being 
calculated.  
3. Number of holding periods: This is equivalent to the number of times a dividend can 
be received if a unit of an asset is held in your inventory from the current period to 
the end of the market. 
4. Average Dividend Per Period: gives the average amount that the dividend will be in 
each period for each unit of the asset that is held in your inventory. The number in 
this column is 20. This is because the average dividend in each period for both X and 
Y is 20 francs. Since both types of assets have the same average dividend per period, 
you can use this table to determine the average holding value for both X and Y.      
5. Average Holding Value Per Unit of Inventory: gives the expected total dividend for 
the remainder of the market for each unit of an asset that is held in your inventory for 
the rest of the market. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the 
remainder of the market, you will receive on average the amount listed in column 5 in 
dividends. Equivalently, it tells you how much in future dividends you give up on 
average when you sell a unit in the current period. The number in column 5 is 
calculated by multiplying the numbers in columns 3 and 4. 
Example: Suppose that there are 4 periods remaining. Since the dividend paid on a unit of 
X has a 50% chance of being 10 and a 50% chance of being 30, the dividend is in 
expectation 20 per period for each unit of X. Since the dividend paid on a unit of Y has 
an 80% chance of being 0 and a 20% chance of being 100, the dividend in expectation is 
also 20 per period for each unit of Y. If you hold a unit of X or Y for 4 periods, the total 
dividend paid on that unit over the 4 periods is in expectation 4×20 = 80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
5. Summary Screen 
At the end of each trading period, a status report will appear on screen for 30 seconds. It 
displays the following information: 
 Your Cash balance before the payment of dividends. This is calculated as: 
CASH BEFORE DIVIDENDS =  BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH  
                                                 + (PERIOD SALES REVENUE – PERIOD EXPENDITURE ON PURCHASES) 
 The dividends paid by X and Y in this period. 
 The number of units of X and Y in your inventory at the end of the period. 
 The total amount of dividends you receive this period. This is calculated as: 
PERIOD TOTAL DIVIDEND = (END-OF-PERIOD UNITS OF X  DIVIDEND PER UNIT OF X FOR THE PERIOD) 
                                                              + (END-OF-PERIOD UNITS OF Y  DIVIDEND PER UNIT OF Y FOR THE PERIOD) 
 Your Cash balance at the end of the period, which is calculated as follows: 
END-OF-PERIOD CASH = CASH BEFORE DIVIDENDS + PERIOD TOTAL DIVIDEND 
 Your Account Total. This is equal to your end-of-period Cash plus the value of your 
holdings of X and Y.  
 
In periods 1 through to 11, your end-of-period holdings of X and Y are valued at their 
respective median traded price in that period. So, your Account Total at the end of 
period 1-11 is calculated as: 
ACCOUNT TOTAL = END-OF-PERIOD CASH  
                              + (END-OF-PERIOD UNITS OF X  MEDIAN TRADED PRICE OF X DURING PERIOD) 
                              + (END-OF-PERIOD UNITS OF Y  MEDIAN TRADED PRICE OF Y DURING PERIOD) 
Since all units of X and Y expire worthless after the final dividend payment at the end 
of period 12 (i.e. at the end of the market), your Account Total at the end of period 12 
is equal to your end-of-period Cash balance: 
ACCOUNT TOTAL (end of period 12) = END-OF-PERIOD CASH 
 The average Account Total in your market. ** this point does not appear in the 
Baseline treatment instructions, but does appear for all other treatments** 
 Your rank out of the 8 participants in your market, based on your Account Total. A 
rank of 1 indicates the highest Account Total; a rank of 2 indicates the second-highest 
Account Total, and so on. ** this point only appears in the instructions for the 
GilCarrot and GilStick treatments**  
 
After seeing the summary screen, press the “Continue” button to go to the next period. 
The next period will begin once everyone has pressed the “Continue” button, or once the 
30 seconds have elapsed, whichever comes first.  
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6. Your Earnings  
** Baseline only: **  
Your earnings from this market will equal the balance of your Account Total at the end 
of the market. Remember that this is equal to your Cash balance at the end of the market.  
Note that you do not have to calculate your earnings by yourself. The computer does all 
the work.  
** Carrot only: ** 
Your earnings from this market will depend on your performance relative to the other 
traders in your market. Your performance is measured by comparing the balance of your 
Account Total at the end of the market (i.e. your final Cash balance) to the average end-
of-market Account total/Cash balance in your market. Your payoff is calculated as 
follows: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 = {
3000                                   𝑖𝑓       𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶
∗
3000 + 2(𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶
∗)       𝑖𝑓         𝐶𝑖 ≥ 𝐶
∗ 
 
 
where Ci is your final Account Total/Cash balance and C* is the average final Account 
total/Cash balance in your market.  
Example: Suppose that the average end-of-market Cash balance in your market is 3500 
francs. If your final Cash balance is say 3200 francs, you will earn 3000 francs. On the 
other hand, if your final Cash balance is say 4500 francs, you will earn 3000 + 2×(4500 – 
3500) = 5000 francs.     
Note that you do not have to calculate your earnings by yourself. The computer does all 
the work. 
** Stick only: ** 
Your earnings from this market will depend on your performance relative to the other 
traders in your market. Your performance is measured by comparing the balance of your 
Account Total at the end of the market (i.e. your final Cash balance) to the average end-
of-market Account total/Cash balance in your market. Your payoff is calculated as 
follows: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 = {
0                                            𝑖𝑓                𝐶𝑖 <
1
2
𝐶∗
      3000                                        𝑖𝑓           
1
2
𝐶∗ ≤ 𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
∗
3000 + 2(𝐶𝑖 −  𝐶
∗)             𝑖𝑓                 𝐶𝑖 > 𝐶
∗ 
 
where Ci is your final Account Total/Cash balance and C* is the average final Account 
total/Cash balance in your market.  
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Example: Suppose that the average end-of-market Cash balance in your market is 3500 
francs. If your final Cash balance is say 1000 francs, you will earn 0 francs from this 
market. If your final Cash balance is 3200 francs, you will earn 3000 francs. On the other 
hand, if your final Cash balance is say 4500 francs, you will earn 3000 + 2×(4500 – 
3500) = 5000 francs.     
Note that you do not have to calculate your earnings by yourself. The computer does all 
the work. 
** GilCarrot only: ** 
Your earnings from this market will depend on your performance relative to the other 
traders in your market. The size of your payoff is determined by your rank at the end of 
the market (i.e. period 12), and is calculated as follows: 
 
Rank Your Earnings (francs) 
1  largest final Account Total/Cash balance 10,000 
2 4,000 
3 4,000 
4 4,000 
5 4,000 
6 4,000 
7 4,000 
8 smallest final Account Total/Cash balance 4,000 
 
Note that you do not have to calculate your earnings by yourself. The computer does all 
the work. 
** GilStick only: ** 
Your earnings from this market will depend on your performance relative to the other 
traders in your market. The size of your payoff is determined by your rank at the end of 
the market (i.e. period 12), and is calculated as follows: 
 
Rank Your Earnings (francs) 
1  largest final Account Total/Cash balance 10,000 
2 4,000 
3 4,000 
 4,000 
‘Last’ smallest final Account Total/Cash balance 0 
   
Note that you do not have to calculate your earnings by yourself. The computer does all 
the work. 
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Average Holding Value Table 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of 
Holding 
Periods 
× 
Average Dividend 
Per Period 
= 
Average Holding 
Value Per Unit 
in Inventory 
12 1 12  20  240 
12 2 11  20  220 
12 3 10  20  200 
12 4 9  20  180 
12 5 8  20  160 
12 6 7  20  140 
12 7 6  20  120 
12 8 5  20  100 
12 9 4  20  80 
12 10 3  20  60 
12 11 2  20  40 
12 12 1  20  20 
 
 
 
